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The Internet is Changing the
Public International Legal System
BY HENRY H. PERRIHT, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION

ublic international law increasingly is called upon to provide
a framework for private international law-treaties for recognition and enforcement of civil judgments and to limit the
adjudicative jurisdiction of civil and crinmal courts, to codify rules
for choice of law, and to define safe harbors for private ordering or selfregulation. New legal institutions, resembling admnistrative agencies
in the national context, are emerging under treaty-based public international law These new international institutions are beginning to exercise limited quasi-legislative (rulemaking)l and quasi-judicial (adjudica-

*Dean, Clucago-Kent College ofLaw. B.S. 1966, M.S. 1970, M.I.T., J.D. 1975,
Georgetown Umversity. Member of the bar in Virgima, Pennsylvania, the District
of Columbia, Maryland, Illinois, and the United States Supreme Court. I appreciate
the thoughtful comments and suggestions from my colleagues, Margaret G.
Stewart, reporter for the ABA Internet Jurisdiction Project, and Richard Warner.
I See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,
July 14, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 782. The Convention empowers the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") assembly to adopt measures relating to the
"admimstration" of the treaties by a three-quarters vote. See id. art. 6, § 3(e), (g).
Amendments to the WIPO convention, in contrast, can be adopted only through the
usual treaty ratification process by each signatory. See id. art. 17; see also Harold
M. White, Jr. & Rita Launa, The Impact ofNew CommunicationTechnologieson
International Telecommunication Law and Policy: Cyberspace and the
Restructurngofthe InternationalTelecommunication Union,32 CAL. W L. REV
1 (1995) (discussing specific changes made by the 1992 Kyoto Plenipotentiary
Conference to increase the rulemaking (policymaking) power of International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU") bodies and to give standing to private
companies and individuals); Knsna Jayakar, Comment, Globalization and the
LegitimacyofInternationalTelecommunicationsStandard-SettingOrganzations,
5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 711 (1998) (explaining reform of ITU standard-
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tory)2 powers. While most of these bodies allow only state parties to
participate formally, there is increasing pressure to allow private standing,
recognizing the growing de facto role of non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") m international affairs.
Information technology in the form of the Internet accelerates this
process in three ways. First, the Internet facilitates the negotiation of treatybased regimes and makes it possible for new international legal machinery
to operate effectively and more quickly Second, the Internet alters the
balance of interests that shapes the political dynamics determining the
content of international law Third, the Internet's global character
challenges traditional state-based precepts of private international law,
increasing the pressure for public international law regimes to regulate
Internet commerce and political activity, directly or indirectly, by
providing frameworks for private ordering.
A. What Makes the InternetSpecial?
To evaluate the arguments presented m this Article, one must
understand how the Internet differs from other information technologies.
Technological innovations have always required adaptation by the
international legal system. Information technologies directly affect
international diplomacy The telegraph changed the way wars were fought
andthe relations between diplomats and heads of state. Wireless telegraphy
(radio) had similar profound impacts. Radio broadcasting m the 1930s
helped brng'the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Mussolini to power.
Television is credited for shaping American withdrawal from Vietnam and
encouraging international intervention m Bosma and Kosovo.
But the Internet is different. For one thing, it is inherently global.
Anyone can set up a Web page on a $2000 computer, connect the computer
to the Internet for $12.95 a month, and publish pages instantly visible
everywhere in the world to anyone who has connected a computer to the
Internet. That kind of global reach is not true with Morse telegraphy,

setting procedures to facilitate rulemakmg, including submission and publication
of documents
on the Internet).
2 See Canada-United States: Free Trade, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281. See also
infra notes 163-181 and accompanying text (summarizmg the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS") junsdiction and procedure); NAFTA
Secretarial: General Information (visited May 11, 2000) <www.nafta-secalena.org/english/index.htm> (summarizmg NAFTA dispute resolution procedures).
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wireless radio communication, television or radio broadcasting. While
users of older information technologies had to make special arrangements
to extend their coverage across national boundaries, users of the Internet
must make special arrangements to localize their activities. Inherently, a
Web page published on a server located m Tuscaloosa, Alabama is just as
accessible m Tirana, Albania, as m Tuscaloosa.
The Internet has another important characteristic that distinguishes it
from earlier information technologies. The price of entry is a $2000
computer. That is all one needs to broadcast to the world through the
Internet or to participate in political dialogue. That is several orders of
magnitude less than it costs to set up a bricks-and-mortar store, a television
broadcast transmitter, or to buy a printing press to publish a newspaper.
These remarkably low economic barriers to entry for the Internet,
compared with older information technologies, empower historically weak
groups within domestic political arenas. Such minimal barriers enable
groups to form connections with each other across national boundaries and
people to create or maintain NGOs.
B. Is the InternetReally Ubiquitous?
Unless the Internet has global scope-and is not a phenomenon limited
to the industrialized West and especially the United States-it is unlikely
to have the transformative effects described in this Article. The popular
myth that the Internet and the World Wide Web ("Web") are dividing the
world into classes of "information haves" and "information have-nots" is
false. On the contrary, its low barriers to entry and inherently international
character reduce gaps between poor countries and rich countries.
Three examples illustrate the facts. Last summer, the popular press
reported that the small Asian country of Bhutan, located in the Himalayas
north of Bangladesh, which has no television service, is aggressively
developing an Internet infrastructure and Internet service providers.3
In December 1999, tins author was in Pnstina, Kosovo, and Kharkov,
Ukraine. In Ukraine, he found a desperately poor country enthusiastically
embracing Internet networking and teaching thousands of college students
to make Web sites to disseminate basic legal information more widely to
domestic law enforcement and legal professionals, and to potential outside
investors.
InKosovo, I found ministenal level officers ofthe Interim Government
of Kosova enthusiastic about the potential of Internet-based e-commerce
3 See

Peter de Jonge, Television'sFinalFrontier,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999,
§ 6, at42.
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as a way of jump-starting Kosovar Albanian economic development. The
Kosovar Albanians recognize that e-commerce can lower the barriers for
starting up small businesses seeking to tap global markets and earn foreign
exchange. At the same time, they recognize that an Internet infrastructure
and Internet service providers can be established qickly and cheaply on
top of existing telephone service, even before fundamental improvements
are made in the technology of wireline telephone service and before
comprehensive cellular telephone services are available.
To be sure, there are still large areas of the world lacking access to
basic technology, but the Internet makes it easier, not harder, for these
populations to plug into the rest of the world.
I. PUBiC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Public international law conventionally addresses relations between
and among sovereign states,4 whileprivate international law conventionally
addresses relations between or among private persons who are citizens of
different states.5 The boundary between public and private international
law, though often treated as distinct, has always been indistinct. 6 Until the
twentieth century, international law involved the personal relations of
sovereigns, while the subject matter of today's private international law

The natural law view, abandoned in favor of positivism under the influence
of John Austin and others, viewed sovereigns as admiistering a system of natural
law, which bound all sovereigns. Positivism viewed all law as originating in some
determinate source. Positivists could understand international law only as based on
agreements between or among sovereigns. See Antony Anghie, Finding the
Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International
Law, 40 HARV INT'L L.J. 9, 9-17 (1999) (describing the historical evolution of
international law).
'See id.
6

See Paul H. Bnetzke, DesigningtheLegalFrameworksforMarketsin Eastern

Europe,7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 35,41-51 (1994) (explaining how European scholars
sought to unify public and private international law even as Americans were

separating them; conflicts rules can be understood as species of public international
law by treating them as limitations on state sovereignty); Harold Hongju Koh, Why
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106

YALE

L.J. 2599, 2609 (1997)

[hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?] (reviewing ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)) (stating that a strong

blending of public and private remained a key feature of legal system even after
Bentham and Austin began to lay the intellectual foundations of dualism).
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was covered by municipal law 7 Erosion of natural law theories in
preference for positivism m the late nineteenth century widened the gap.'
This divide is reflected m the tension between momsm and dualism m
international law theory 9 Dualists distinguished sharply between public
international law as the law of relations between states and private
international law as the law governing persons. 0 Momsts sought unification.11
International commercial law straddles any gap between the two types
of international law, because it "regulates both private persons and
states." 2 Admiralty law provides a strong example. Admiralty restricted
the power of states against vessels belonging to nationals of other states. It
also was a source of right by individuals against vessels belonging to other
individuals."
The growing inportance of transnational business in the late decades
of the twentieth century, and the increasing emphasis on international

'See Mark W Jams, Should We Continue to DistinguishBetween Public and
Private InternationalLaw?, Academic Workshop (Apr. 27, 1985), in 79 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 352 (1985).
1 Positivism seeks a legislative source for law and one cannot find it m the
international context because there is no international legislature. Natural law easily
supplies the source for international law. See generallyAnghle, supranote 4, at 1018 (describing the shift from naturalism to positivism in theory of international
law).
9See Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect ofInternationalEconomic Law in the
United States and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 556, 561-62
(1996-97) (explaining miomsm and dualism).
See Janis, supra note 7
1 See generallyBin Cheng, Introductionto Subjects ofInternationalLaw, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 23 (Mohammed Bedjaoui

ed., 1991) (writing that monists, "led by Hans Kelsen, believe that international and
municipal law
[form]
a single normative system" because the ultimate
subject of all law is the individual; dualists, led by H. Tnepel and D. Anziolottyi,
believe they are distinct legal systems). Monism correlates with a natural law view.
Dualism correlates with positivism. Momsts believe national courts are obligated
to apply international law; dualists believe they apply international law only when
the national legislature has so provided. Thus, there is a correlation between direct
effect and momsm. See id.
" Joel P Trachtman, The InternationalEconomic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 35 (1996) [hereinafter Trachtman, InternationalEconomic
Law].
" See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982,
21 I.L.M. 2161 ("UNCLOS") (establishing uniform law regarding admiralty).
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human rights law in the same time period, stimulated a return to a more
unified view, 14 albeit without an explicit abandonment ofpositivism as the
theoretical foundation. The goal of international law is to create and
maintain systemic stability and to reduce fictions among states." Global
commerce and international politics, accelerated by the Internet, threaten
to increase interstate friction unless international law keeps pace. The goal
of international law always has been universality-the result, politically,
of harmonization and convergence. 16 The harmonization of international
law, a result of Internet access proliferation, suggests a greater scope for
international law
A.

What is PrivateLaw?

The terms "public" and "private" law are common m a variety of
contexts and have also carried a variety of other meanings.
Because the public/private distinction emerged from the notion that there
is a separate and distinct private order, private law was deemed law that
protected "pre-political rights.
Private law, then, was that part of the
legal system protecting the private ordering; public law consisted of
government compulsions restricting private freedom"
Under that
definition, property law, tort law, and contract law may be considered
examples of private law, and labor law and constitutional law public
17
law.

According to Professors Philip Fnckey and Daniel Farber, the
distinctionbetween public andpnvate law has been blurred, m part because
of the critique of legal realists, observing that private law reflects public policy choices, and the tendency of public law to grant new individual rights.' Joel P Trachtman has observed that "private law is an oxy'4 See Janis, supra note 7, at 353.
'5 See Trachtman, InternationalEconomic Law, supra note 12, at 45-46.
'6See id.
17Lan Cao, Looking at Communities andMarkets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV

841,841 n.2 (1999) (quoting Daniel A. Farber &Philip P Frickey, In the Shadow
ofthe Legislature:The Common Law in the Age ofthe New PublicLaw, 89 MICH.

L. REV 875, 886-87 (1991)). Legal reform for transitional societies focuses on
private law in the sense that it emphasizes developing the law of property,
contracts, corporations, and financial markets. See Bnetzke, supranote 6,at4l-5 1.
18 See Farber & Fnckey, supra note 17, at 886; see also Trachtman, InternationalEconomic Law, supranote 12, at 34.
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moron."'19 In fact, he points out, conflict of laws-the traditional category
of private international law-relates to public law 20 "All conflict of laws
rules allocate power to government."' Public interests in a market
economy, therefore, include private interests.'
The end-goal of conflict of laws-as of law more generally-is the
maximization of the welfare of the constituents of the relevant society If
international conflict of laws rules are analogous to constitutional
law-describing the allocation of power horizontally within a unitary
order-the relevant society whose welfare these rules must maximize is
international society Of course, there is nothing quite comparable to a
world constitution, and world society is far more decentralized than, for
example, the federal society of the United States. 2
The private-public distinction is inappropriate in the context of conflict of
laws, assuming it is valid in any context. From a law and economics
perspective, the private sphere is the sphere normally left to market
ordering. Thus, the private sphere, in theory, absent transaction costs or
market failures, needs no law. However, it is generally agreed by even the
most extreme law and economics theorists that in practice, the private
sphere needs law to reduce transaction costs by facilitating the assignment
of stable property rights and rules of tort liability and contractual
responsibility. Thus, public-policy values at the state-level would be
expected to incorporate certain values from the private level. 4
B. The Role ofPublic Law
Public international law circumscribes the legitimate exercise of state
power to regulate private conduct and to decide private disputes, through
19 Trachtman, InternationalEconomic Law, supranote 12, at 34.
See Joel P Trachtman, Conflict ofLaws and Accuracy in the Allocation of
Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 985 (1994)

[hereinafter Trachtman, Conflict ofLaws].
2 Id. Trachtman proposes allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction to government(s) whose constituents are affected by the subject matter, in proportion to the
relative magnitude of such effects, as accurately as is merited given transaction
costs in allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction. See id. at 987
See id. at 997
Id. at 1032 (footnotes omitted).
24Id.
at 1035 (footnotes omitted).
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rules ofjurisdiction, choice of law andjudgment recognition. s These rules,
making up what American lawyers call conflict of laws,2 6 link public and
private international law When private persons or entities resort to civil
courts to resolve their disputes, they necessarily encounter conflict of laws
rules, which determine the power of national lawmakers, adjudicators, and
enforcement resources.
Although conflict of laws is considered to be but another name for
private mternational law, its rules reflect public law limitations on the
exercise of sovereign power, motivated by the reality that, when one
sovereign oversteps its bounds, it encroaches upon the prerogatives of
another. The rules therefore reflect a comity among sovereigns, seeking to
preserve the essential attributes of sovereign power to each.27
Trachtman says that the "best solution to conflict of laws problems is
negotiation and agreement on conflicts rules by governments '28 throughthe
treaty making process; in other words, using public international law
mechanisms to change the content of private international law2 9 Vertical
public law litigation involves the assertion by individuals of rights derived
from public international law in regular courts. Harold Koh argues that
vertical litigation is growing i nnportance. °
Because public law defines the contours of private law, the public law
questions with respect to Internet regulation include the role of private
ordering. Two kinds of hybrid legal systems can be envisioned. One kind
See id. at 978-84.
is a problem m talking about private international law. Europeans often refer to "jurisdiction" when Americans refer to "adjudicative
jurisdiction" or "personal jurisdiction." Europeans often refer to "conflict of laws"
when Americans refer to "prescriptive jurisdiction" or "choice of law." Most
Americans use the term "conflict of laws" to refer to the entire body of private
law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971).
international
27 See Trachtman, Conflict ofLaws, supra note 20, at 1035.
28 Id.
at 990-91.
29 Trchtman acknowledges, however, that treaty negotiation often is impracticable because of levels of controversy. Failing treaty negotiation, he
proposes application of his rule by courts adjudicating particular cases. Id. at 99091.
10See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublicLawLitigation, 100 YALE L.
J. 2347,2347 (1991) [hereinafter Koh, TransnationalPublicLawLitigation].Koh
distinguishes vertical from horizontal transnational public law litigation. He
marshals evidence in support of the proposition that vertical transnational public
law litigation, common until the middle half of the nineteenth century, is important
once again.
26 Terminology
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opens national courts to private litigation based on norms derived from
public international law. The other kind uses public international law
mechanisms to define structures for private ordering, much as American
labor law defines structures for private ordering of the workplace. 1
C. PublicLaw andPrivateInstitutions
Many private institutions enjoy power in international politics and law
rivaling that exerted by traditional states.32 Francois Rigaux's "Transnational Civil Society," involves three types ofactors: the state acting through
its domestic law, the community of states in the international order, and
individuals acting through private initiatives including NGOs.3 3 "It is
through the non-governmental organizations and, more and more often,
through the mass media that world public opinion makes its voice heard on
' Professor
the major problems requiring action at the international level."34
Koh's "transnationalist" school ofintemational relations theory emphasizes
the role of private actors in international law 31 Professor Anne-Mane
Slaughter agrees.36 Private actors create purely private legal relationslups
by dealing with each other and create mixed relationships by dealing with
states. As political actors, these same private actors coordinate theirprivate
self-interest across national boundaries, exerting pressure vertically through
national interest groups and thereby shaping the policy of states.37 The
See Farber & Frickey, supranote 17, at 886 n.53.
T. Mathews, PowerShift, 76 FOREIGN AFF 50,58 (1997) (arguing that states must compromise cherished sovereign roles, including cooperation
with the private sector, to control international crime). NGOs create new
constituencies
for compliance with international law. See id. at 59.
33
See Cheng, supra note 11, at 12.
' Id. See also Martin Wolf, Uncivil Society, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 1,
1999, at 14 (lamenting the role of NGOs in blocking negotiation of multilateral
agreement on investment; "only elected governments can be properly responsible
for the making of law, domestically and internationally
to grant any private
interests a direct voice m negotiations over how coercion is to be applied is
fundamentally subversive of constitutional democracy"). "If NGOs were indeed
representative of the wishes and desires of the electorate those who embrace their
ideas would be in power. Self evidently, they are not." Id.
3 See Harold Honglu Koh, TransnationalLegalProcess,
75 NEB. L. REV 181,
183-85 (1996) [heremafterKoh, TransnationalLegalProcess]
(explaining the role
of private actors in transnational legal processes).
36 See Anne-Mane Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF
183,37184 (1997).
See Koh, TransnationalLegalProcess,supra note 35, at 203-05.
31

32 See Jessica
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Internet will strengthen all these phenomena by making the horizontal
relationships easier despite distance and regardless of formal national
38
borders.
Just as domestic interest groups are an essential part of the political
dynamics of domestic politics, NGOs are an essential part of international
rulemaking and enforcement.39 Indeed, because the institutional structure
for international governmental functions is less complete than that for state
governmental functions, NGOs play a proportionately greater role in the
international context than in the domestic context."
NGOs are not a new phenomenon. They were instrumental in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in stopping the slave trade, promoting
peace through international arbitration, advocating worker solidarity,
encouraging free trade, and harmonzig international law for maritime
commerce.

41

McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman identified seven functions performed by NGOs: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal.42 Intelligence is gathering, analyzing,
and disseminating iformation.43 Promotion is advocacy of particular
policy options.' Prescription is actual participation in rulemakig.4
Invocation is an accusatory role when norm violations are detected. 46
Application is actual adjudication.4 7 Termination extinguishes norms.48
Appraisal is the evaluation of the performance of formal international
institutions and norms.49

The principal limitation on the influence of the Internet will be language
differences.
39 See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation:NGOs and InternationalGovernance, 18 MICH. J. INT'LL. 183, 185 (1997).
40 See generallyid. at 189-90.
41 See id. at 191-95.
42 See id. at 271 (citing Myres S. McDougal et al., The World ConstitutiveProcess ofAuthoritativeDecision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW EssAYs: A SUPPLEMENT
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (Myres S. McDougal
& W Michael Reisman eds., 1981)).
43 See McDougal et al., supra
note 42, at 221.
4See Charnovitz, supranote 39, at 271 & n.797 (citing McDougal et al., supra
note 42, at 221-22 (defining private associations as groups not seeking power)).
41 See Id. at 272.
38

46

See id.

47 See id.
48 See

id. at 273.

49 See id.
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III. THE INTERNET IMPROVES THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM

International law affects human beings in two basic ways: it changes
the way national law institutions govern them, and it may grant them rights
and impose duties on them directly, which are then enforced by national or
international courts and agencies. The Internet's influence is manifest in
the increasing ease with which new international agreements are negotiated, in the impact such agreements have on state behavior, and in
enforcement of international law norms directly against states and private
persons. There are thus three branches to the argument that the Internet
strengthens public international law- the Internet facilitates development
ofnew law; the Internet promotes acceptance of international law by states;
and the Internet aids in detecting violations and imposing sanctions.
The arguments are interrelated: the same groups that promote the
writing ofnew treaties also engage in domestic political activities to induce
states to conform their behavior to the treaties once they are adopted. The
same groups are also active in investigating violations.
A. The InternetFacilitatesthe Development ofNew PublicInternational
Law
The Internet facilitates development of new public international law in
two ways. First, it reduces the transaction costs and speeds up the process
of negotiating new treaties. This effect is evident mostly in the preparatory
work that precedes formal adoption oftreaty language. Second, the Internet
empowers groups advocating new treaty law-primarily NGOs-making
it easier for them to form bonds across state boundaries and to participate
in the preparatory work for treaties even though they lack substantial
resources.
1. EnhancingTreaty Negotiation
The Internet makes it easierto negotiate international agreements. Paul
Szasz dissectedthe treaty making process into four major and some twenty
subordinate tasks or "stages."5 Many of these stages can be sped up and
50 See Paul

C. Szasz, GeneralLaw Malang Processes,in 1 UNITED NATIONS
LEGAL ORDER 70-71 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995). The
four stages named by Szasz are: (1) the introduction of a bill; (2) its assignment to
a committee and the committee's report; (3) adoption by one house of the
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made more effective by use of the Internet. In the initiation stage, virtual
libraries and electronic surveys of participating governments enhance
assessment of the likelihood of success and development of estimates of
schedule and costs.5' In the second stage, when the text of a multilateral
treaty is being drafted, the Internet makes it easier to conduct preliminary
studies of the state of law, and to distribute completed studies and
analyses.52 Drafting groups can deliberate through the Internet. When
governmental consultations are necessary, drafts canbe made available and
comments received through the Web or e-mail. In the adoption stage,
deliberation software can increase the options for consensus formation and
voting. During the ratification ("entry into force") stage, virtual library
functions can ease the burdens of smaller, less developed countries, and can
organize reservations made by individual states. 3 Once the treaty enters
into force, placing treaty depositories on the Internet improves
compliance. 54
The actual process of treaty negotiation begins with months or even
years of preparatory work, usually originating m workshops or conferences
in which experts in the field-typically professors, public officials from
concerned national agencies, and lawyers from interested private and nonprofit organizations-crystallize the issues and the alternatives which
might eventually be expressed in the form of treaty language. As with any
negotiation process, this preparatory work depends upon eachparticipant's
ability to perform several tasks. The participants must persuade others that
their views of reality are accurate and legitimate, form alliances based on
common perceptions and goals, and ultimately persuade opinion leaders in
broader communities that their recommendations are worthy of acceptance
because they relate to the political agenda of a complex array of public
officials and interest groups usually focused on the national political
process.
In this work leading up to the actual session in which the text of a
treaty might be adopted, e-mail plays an umportant role in allowing

legislature and then by the other, and finally (4) approval by the executive or return
to the litigation.
51 See id.
5 See id.
See id.
54 Szasz observes that the availability of treaties is "woefully fragmented." See
Szasz, supra note 50, at 107 Dawson observed that legal publishing enhances
legitimacy and development of legal norms. Cf.JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES
OF THE LAW xi-xii (1968).
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preparatory conferences to be orgamzed. For example, this author recently
participated m aworkshop on Internetjunsdiction organlzedby The Hague
Conference on Private International Law All of the invitations, negotiations over format, arrangements, and distribution of background materials
occurred via e-mail. There was only one telephone conversation and no
letters or faxes.
Once a preparatory conference is organized, Web pages supplement
exchange of documents by e-mail, making it more convenient and much
quicker for participants to exchange draft language and other relevant preexisting documents that they may wish to cite as precedent or from which
to extract model language. After the face-to-face meetings are adjourned,
at which participants develop personal bonds that can support trust and
make further conversation more reliable, e-mail and specialized Web
sites-often closed to the public-facilitate completion of follow-up work
55
agreed to at the face-to-face conference.
Eventually, the treaty-making process moves to another phase, in
which advocates of a treaty must persuade their governments to support
recommendations emerging from the preparatory conferences and to place
actual treaty negotiation sufficiently high on their political agendas. At this
point, the Web's publishing function becomes more important. Interest
groups favoring preparatory recommendations use the Web to inform the
public and mobilize their constituencies for action. The Web sites dealing
with land mines are examples of this process at work, as were various Web
sites supporting United States participation in the drafting of a statute for
an international criminal court, preceding The Rome Conference of 1998.56
While simply putting up a Web site does not mean that many people will
read it, the way that various Internet search engines work enhances the
likelihood that even the most obscure organizations can find an audience
for their Web sites.57 An ordinary member of the public or anyone else
interested in the subject of landmines or international crimes is likely to
find a Web site advocating a new treaty on those subjects.
Moreover, the political processes leading up to actual final agreement
on treaty text rarely are as completely democratic as the foregoing

51 The same processes may result m a series of preparatory meetings involving
configurations of experts, public officials, and private interest groups.
different
56See Amnesty International:InternationalCnme Court-"Crnppledat Birth"
(visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.amnesty.org/news/1998/118jul98.htm>
11 There is some delay before new Web pages appear on the major search engine sites-usually several weeks pass before search engine crawlers find new
material.
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discussion suggests. A variety of "regnes" exists in the international legal
system that provide continuing frameworks for preparatory work in treaty
negotiation. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, the ITU,
the WTO, the WIPe, and other United Nations ("UN") organizations have
permanent secretariats who maintain evolving agendas referring to
possibilities for negotiation ofnew treaties. Now, all of these organizations
have Web sites that make it easy for anyone interested in their general
subject matter to access the work plans and determine the status of
preparatory work on treaties. As the preparatory work proceeds, these Web
sites provide forums for mobilizing political support (and opposition).
All of these possibilities facilitate rulemaking in international
institutions, where distances otherwise would be a barrier. They also
increase the role of NGOs because they represent channels for NGO
participation additional to traditional state-controlled channels.
Facilitating the treaty negotiation process can reduce some of the
disadvantages of reliance on customary international law5 8 One of the
difficulties with customary international law always has been the difficulty
in determining its content. Professor Jack Goldsmith asserts that the
Internet will increase the mcoherence of customary international law,
making it even more perilous to incorporate into United States federal
common law 59 Notwithstanding Professor Goldsmith's argument, the
Internet may actually inprove the coherence of customary international

" Public international law includes customary international law as well as
treaty-based law. Customary international law emerges from state practice backed
by opmio juns. Opino juns signifies that state conduct is intended to express a
legal norm. Opuno juns means that a state acts because it believes its actions are
mandated by a norm, or that the conduct is intended to give rise to a new norm. In
colloquial terms, opmio juns exists when a state acts in order to follow precedent
set by other actions, or to set a new precedent which will be followed in the future.
See Luigi Condorelli, Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAw" ACHIEVEMENTS AND
PROSPECTS, supra note 11, at 189.
11 Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourts and the
IncorporationofInternationalLaw,111 HARV. L. REV 2260 (1998) (stating that
"CIL [customary international law] should not be treated as federal law in the
absence of authorization from the federal political branches"), with Beth Stephens,
TheLawofOurLand:CustomarylnternationalLawasFederalLawAfterEne,
66
FORDHAM L. REV 393, 395-97 (1997) (criticizing the Bradley and Goldsmith
view). Professor Goldsmith's attack points out that the "new" customary
international law is developed more quickly, depends less on actual state practice,
and is fragmented by the increased number of states. See generally Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra.
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law.' Even if it does not, the Internet's facilitation of treaty negotiation
will make customary international law less important.
It is important, however, not to exaggerate the claims that the Internet
facilitates development of new treaty law Whether or not states agree to
treaties depends on their underlying interests. As Part IV explains, the
Internet may alter those interests, but the resulting interests balance may
oppose, rather than favor, international agreement. It does, however, open
up new channels of political interaction, domestically, and across national
boundaries. These new channels make it easier for international political
movements to be organized, and forthose movements to affect the position
of states. Tis phenomenon is discussed in the next section.
2. Empowenng Advocates
The Internet's low economic barriers to entry provide a voice to
political actors who otherwise would be dened effective access to the
public arena. Because the Internet gives them access, and is inherently
global, these actors can find like-minded people in other states, thus
enabling them to build political movements across national lines.
Once political actors have organized, the Internet makes it easier for
them to mobilize public opinion, thus altering the position of state actors.
The movement for a treaty against landmines is a good example.6 1 Web
pages permitted the horrors of landmines to be dramatized to the general
public and political activists likely to be sympathetic to the need for a new
treaty The Internet permitted these activists, once aroused, to coordinate
their arguments across national lines, and to use political action and
sympathetic governmental positions mone countryto promote sympathetic
positions in other countries.

' The Internet makes it easier for advocates and decision makers to find
examples of state practice and statements of public officials that may be evidence
of opmio juns. Before the Internet unproved the transparency of governmental
decision making and scrutiny of governmental actiotis, research into customary
international law either required tedious review of public documents in paper
formats scattered over many repositories or reliance on commentators who may
have conducted research or who may simply be expressing theoretical opinions
with little support from real world conduct.
61See LandMine Info Center, TAKE ACTION: Urge the White House to Ban
Land Mines December 3 is National Call-In Day.
Pick up the Phone and be
Heard! (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.care.org/info_center/landmmes/
lm_news.html>; UNICEF, Land Mines: Hidden Killers (visited Feb. 4, 2000)
<http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/hideldll.htm>
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Because the regular press and media increasingly consult the Web for
sources of news,6 2 growing use of the Web by political action groups also
gives such groups a more effective voice than in traditional media. The
Internet permits campaigns to be organized, funds to be raised, petitions to
be signed, and public officials to be contacted, all more easily than could
be done without the Internet.
Of course, the same channels can be used by opponents of any new
treaty. 63 Thus, the availability of the Internet does not necessarily mean that
treaties are more likely to be adopted, it simply opens up new avenues for
political dialogue-avenues that are indifferent to national boundaries. The
Internet has the effect of broadening the scope of political debate and
making it more international in character.
NGOs, organizing and expressing themselves through the Internet,
have had great influence on the treaty negotiation process for many years. 6
NGOs such as Amnesty International and the Lawyers' Committee on
Civil Rights perform important intelligence and invocation functions. NGO
activity has been especially influential in the environmental arena. At
the Stockholm Conference in the early 1970s, NGOs outnumbered
accredited governmental representatives, and by 1987 were allowed to
address plenary sessions drafting environmental treaties.6" Their role thus
moved from promotion to prescription. Greenpeace typifies aggressive
performance ofthe invocation function.' Many people think that the Rome
treaty for the International Criminal Court would not have been concluded
when it was without NGOs leading the charge. Human rights NGOs
mobilized world opinion in favor of international intervention m Bosma
and Kosovo.
The Internet improves the operation and therefore the strength of
NGOs. Internet use improves performance of three of the seven functions
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman identify as performed by NGOs

62 See Allison Fass, Media Talk; JournalistsAmong the Online Crowd, N.Y
TIMEs, Mar. 30, 2000, at C5.
63 The demonstrations, noting, and sabotage of WTO Web servers in Seattle,
Washington in December, 1999, are illustrative. See Sam Howe Verhovek, After
Riots, Seattle is ChagnnedYet Cheerful,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at A28.
6 See Charnovitz, supranote 39, at 272 (providing examples ofNGO influence
m treaty
negotiations).
65 See id. at 262-64.
66 See

id. at 264.
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-"intelligence," ".promotion,"and "prescnption" 67-- thereby facilitating
the organization and operation of NGOs and enhancing their influence.
Use of the Internet reduces the transaction costs for organizmg,
maintaining, and carrying out the functions ofanNGO. Group organization
and maintenance cost advantages from Internet use are greater when group
members are widely dispersed. Thus, information technology makes it
possible to contact potential NGO constituents dispersed around the world,
while the cost of communicating with them and enlisting their support will
likely be less than if they were forced to use non-Internet resources. This
function of the Internet instantly replaces or supplements direct mail
campaigns and newsletters. As credit card commerce on the Internet
becomes increasingly common, more people will be equippedto contribute
to NGOs directly through the Internet, thus expanding fundraising
possibilities.
More than this kind of membership maintenance is possible. NGO
activities can be directed and coordinated through e-mail and the Web. A
communication associated with direction and coordination can either be
public orprivate, depending on how e-mail and Web systems are set up. An
NGO can create a Web page for each major project and allow project
participants to post messages to discussion groups placed within that Web
page. As soon as a project participant has something to report or a project
leader has a new direction to give, that information instantly is available to
other key members sunply by copying a file from one directory to another
on an Internet-connected computer.
B. The InternetPromotesthe Acceptance ofPublic InternationalLaw by
States
The Internet promotes national adoption of new public international
law by empowering national interest groups who advocate ratification of
new treaties.6 8 Tins is one aspect of the interpenetration69 process. (The

6

Id. at 271 and accompanying text. Intelligence is gathering, analyzing, and
disseminating information. Promotion is advocacy of particular policy options.
Prescription is actual participation in rulemaking. See id.
68 This phenomenon involves many of the same effects of the Internet-and
many of the same groups-as the phenomena relating to negotiation of treaties. It
focuses, however, on the domestic political process, while the preceding section
focused on international forums.
69 Interpenetration refers to the mutual influence between national and
international legal systems. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,
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other aspect involves the adoption of international norms as domestic
legislation is framed and international and domestic cases are decided by
courts. The Internet also facilitates these post-ratification aspects of
interpenetration.) In other words, the Internet makes traditional sovereign
states more permeable, weakening many of their traditional powers, at the
same time that it empowers NGOs m all three of their functions.
As the Internet further blurs the lines between domestic interest groups
and international NGOs, it strengthens the ability of individuals and smallgroup interests-weak in domestic politics-to be expressed and given.
fulfillment through international mstitutions-NGOs. Then, the Internet
makes it easier for NGOs to influence domestic politics. It is no accident
that China's growing restrictions on political freedom mHong Kong aimed
to limit the role of international organizations in localpolitics. International
organizations, especially in the human rights area, already play an active
role in creating embarrassment for existing domestic political institutions.
The Internet and the Web fundamentally change the possibilities for
mobilizing these interest groups and focusing their power on political
choices taken by individual states. NGO performance of promotion
functions 7' was enhanced as NGOs developed "sophisticated information
networks linking dissidents, sympathetic governments, and the media."
No longer is the choice of intervention in East Timor, Kosovo or
Bosnia solely the province of political elites and professionals m diplomacy; now, due to information technology, it is a mass political question.
Because the Internet increases access to the channels of communication to
these worldwide audiences, it fundamentally alters the balance of power
between different political actors.
In his illuminating synthesis of competing and overlapping strands of
international law, Harold Koh explores the process of "norm internalizasupra note 6, at 2654.
7 See HumanRights Watch WorldReport
2000 (visited May 11, 2000) <http://
www.hrw.org/wr2k> (providing a country-by-country report on human rights
abuses).
7 Promotion-advocacy of particular policy options-is one of the sevenNGO
functions identified by McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman. See McDougal et al.,
supra note 42, at 221, see also Charnovitz, supra note 39, at 271.
7 Charnovitz, supranote 39, at 264. The Internet
enhances performance of the
promotion function by NGOs. NGOs can use the Web (indeed, they already are
using the Web m the United States for this purpose) to mobilize mass opinion m
support ofparticular positions m rulemakmg orenforcementproceedings. They can
orgamze e-mail campaigns to decision makers, frame petitions, and collect
signatures.
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tion."I He explains that transnational actors such as public officials, "norm
entrepreneurs," andNGOs mobilize domestic elites and popular constituencies and set m motion a domestic political process that internationalizes a
norm of international law 74 The process can be viewed at three overlapping
and potentially reinforcing levels: (1) the level of the international system
itself; (2) the level of individuals and groups who make up the state; and
(3) the processes and institutions of domestic politics.75
International institutions make a difference m compliance because they
clarify norms, provide a mechanism for detecting noncompliance, and
commit the parties to interact repeatedly over a sustained period of time. 6
Gradually, the international norms interpenetrate the domestic legal system
of the participants, ripening into "symbolic structures, standard operating
procedures, and other internal mechamsms to maintain habitual compliance
with the internalized norms."' Democratization strengthens the effect of
international law because international law as rhetoric influences masses
more than it influences leadership cadres, who are more likely to set policy
based on interests in the realist tradition.
Interpenetration refers to the mutual influence between national and
international legal systems.7" State-based law influences international law
by providing models forjudges applying international law. Already, statebased systems are reference points for international law under the doctrine
of customary international law, which partially depends on the universal
practice in national legal systems.7 9 Working in the other direction,
international law also influences state-based law That process is hardly
new Early m the nineteenth century, concepts of private international law

'3 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, supranote 6, at 2645-46;
HaroldHongju Koh, The l998FrankelLecture:BrngznglnternationalLawHome,
35 Hous. L. REv 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture]
(offenng examples of international law internalization: 12-mine territorial limit
from the UNCLOS I, Landmmes Treaty, European Human Rights Convention,
and Torture Convention).
74 See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, supra note 6, at 2648
(analyzing the example of ABM Treaty Interpretation debate).
75 See id. at 2649-50.
See id.at 2653 (analyzing the example of domestic pressures to comply with
Oslo Accords by Netanyahu government).
77 Id. at 2654.
78 See id.
79 SeegenerallyDemjanjukv.Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (analysis
by court demonstrates the principle of umversality), vacated by 10 F.3d 338 (6th
Cir. 1993).
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often were the reference points for federal courts deciding American cases
of first impression relating to personal jurisdiction and choice of law8 0
Interpenetration involves a shift from dualism to monism as a
characterization of international law as it actually operates. The momsm/dualism dichotomy is giving way in the international law literature to
a more nuanced approach which recognizes both theoretical and practical
problems confronting ajudge who would directly apply international law 1
Increasingly, domestic courts m the United States are pressed to consider
international legal norms along with purely domestic norms in deciding
cases.82 Although some American courts have declared international law to
be part of domestic law, 83 the more usual approach is to presume that
Congress intends for United States statutory law to be interpreted as
consistent with international law 84 Well-recognized principles determine
whether treaties to which the United States is a party have "direct effect"
(i.e., can be applied directly as sources of law in domestic cases), reflecting
some reticence in wholesale incorporation of international legal norms into
the domestic legal order.85 Some foreign states, however, directly and
explicitly incorporate some or all of international law into their domestic

80 See D'Arcy v Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1850) (using international principles to invalidate ajudgment).
81 See Abdelkader Boye, The Application of the Rules ofInternationalPublic
Law in MunicipalLegal Systems, in INTERNATIONAL LAW" ACHIEVEMENTS AND
PROSPECTS, supra note 11, at 289.
82 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,375-76 (1998) (holding that
the failure
to assert a Vienna Convention claim m state court waived the claim); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding thatthe Alien Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1789), incorporates international law violations).
83 See
Banco Nacional De Cubav Sabbatino, 193 F Supp. 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y
1961), rev'don othergrounds,376 U.S. 398,422 (1964) (holding thatinternational
law may be part of United States law in some circumstances).
84 This follows the so-called "Charming Besty" canon. See Curtis A. Bradley,
The Charming Besty CanonandSeparationofPowers:Rethinlng the Interpretive
Role oflnternationalLaw,86 GEO. L.J. 479,482 (1998) (exploring United States
constitutional implications of the doctrine that United States statutes should be
interpreted
so as to be consistent with international law).
8
1 See Breard,523 U.S. at 375-76 (rejecting an international law claim to prevent the execution of a pnsoner; claim was waived by failure to present it in state
court); In re Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 988 F Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (denying extradition pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by an international
tribunal); Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying habeas
corpus writ).
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legal systems.8 6 The Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
urged state court judges to pay more attention to foreign law m deciding
purely domestic cases:87
[W]e can cross the divide separating us from other jurisdictions
around the world. And if we do so with the modest intent to borrow ideas
on classifying, discussing, and solving a particular problem, we should
not be deterred by unfamiliarity with foreign legal systems. We may fail
to understand aparticular system of law or even misinterpret some foreign
decisions. Nevertheless, we may also find unexpected answers or new
88
challenges to domestic legal issues.
One barrier to the application of international law in domestic court
systems is the difficulty of gaining knowledge of international law8 9 By
some estimates, there are more than 15,000 treaties to which the United
States is a party 1o There are surely thousands of scholarly opinions about
the content of customary international law scattered all over the world. The
comprehensive scope of legal publishers in the United States with respect
to domestic legal materials is not typical of other countries nor of
international materials. Even an institution such as the Library of International Relations at Chicago-Kent College of Law, whose mission it is to
organize international materials, must devote considerable efforts to locate
them, obtain copies, and index them for feasible access.
See BULG. CONST. (adopted 1991) ch. 1, art. 5, cl. 4 (providing that international treaties ratified by Bulgaria have the force of domestic law and supersede
contrary provisions of national law); CONST. OF Russ. F (approved 1993) ch. 1,
art. 15, cl. 4 ("The commonly recognized principles and norms of the intemational
law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component
part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation
stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international
treaty shall apply ").
7 See Shirley S. Abrahamson &
Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a Courtroom:
Judging
in
the
New
Millennium,
26 HOFSTRA L. REV 273 (1997).
88Id. at 286.
89 See Boye, supra note 81, at 291.
90 By 1979, the United States was estimated to have become party to 8909
agreements, including 1281 treaties. Between 1980 and 1992, the United States
became party to another 4728 agreements, including 218 treaties, for a total of
13,637 agreements and 1499 treaties. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 203-04 (2d ed. 1995).
86
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The Internet facilitates interpenetration in both directions by making
international law and state-based law more available to judges and
legislators all around the world. Rigaux's "Transnational Civil Society"9 1
is strengthened by the Internet. Because of unproved accessibility to
international norms, domestic judges and legislators are more likely to be
influenced by them, thus increasing interpenetration. Improved communication and information exchange through the Internet strengthen the role
of NGOs in domestic political processes as well, further increasing
interpenetration.
Legal decision makers cannot use another body of law as a reference
if they do not know its content. The Internet makes it easier for them to
discover its content. No longer must litigants and judges rely upon
cumbersome and expensive mechanisms ofhaving expert witnesses present
their opinions about the content of a foreign legal system; now, the litigants
and judges sinply may look up the law themselves.
The United States was an early leader in making its law visible to
people outside the United States. The Federal Web Locator 2 provides a
portal for accessing nearly one thousand federal agency-sponsored Web
sites, and the Thomas system established by the Library of Congress in
1994 offers access to all major congressional materials.93 Further, many
state legislatures make bills and enacted laws available on the Internet.94 A
combination of direct action by federal appellate courts and a cooperative
effort by several American law schools make the complete text of all
federal appellate opinions available on the Web, and a rapidly growing
fraction of state court systems are doing likewise." The United States
Department of State has begun to publish on the Web treaties to which the
96
United States is a party, beginning with trade agreements.
Many other nations are following suit. The decisions of the British
House of Lords are on the Web.9' International human rights treaties are
91

fwl/>

See Cheng, supra note 11.
The FederalWeb Locator (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.mfoctr.edu/

93See

Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Sept. 5, 1998)
<http://thomas.loc.gov>
4See, e.g., Illinois General Assembly Web site (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://
www.legis. state.il.us/>
9 See, e.g.,
Illinois JudicialSystem Online Office ofthe ReporterofDecisions
Web site (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.state.il.us/court/default.htm>
96SeeAgreementsNegotiated
by the UnitedStatesTradeRepresentative(visited
Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/index.html> (WTO and theNorth
American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA]).
9 7See House
of Lords Home Page (visited Feb. 21, 2000) <http://www.
publications.parliment.uk/pa/ld/ldhome.htm>
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available through the Council of Europe ("COE"). The UN is doing a
goodjob of making scanned images ofpages of all treaties m the UN series
available on the Web. 9 The COE's Venice Commission'00 is moving its
collection of constitutional court decisions to the Web. Aided by efforts of
this author and many of his students, decisions in Croatia, Macedonia,
Bosnia, Albania, and-soon-Kosovo will be available as well. 10' China
is unproving legal transparency in order to hasten economic development by making court decisions and legislative materials available on the
Web. 102
While mere availability of legal materials does not ensure interpenetration, it makes it easier to achieve. As noted above, there is a growing voice
within the American judicial community for referencing materials outside
the United States. 0 3The kind of large scale Web publishing of international
documents described in the preceding paragraphs results in the extension
of the virtual law library already present on the Internet. Such an expanded
library provides a rich source of models for interest groups and parliamentarians writing new law No longer must the author of a new commercial
law for Bosma-Herzegovina take a stab in the dark; the author can begin
with recently enacted commercial laws in Croatia and emerging models
See European Court of Human Rights Home Page (visited July 3, 1998)
<http://www.echr.coe.mt>
" See generallyIndex of/Depts/Treaty/Collectionsenes(visited July 3, 1998)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/collection/series>
'" The European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice
Commission) is an advisory body on constitutional law, set up within the Council
of Europe ("COE"). The Venice Commission is the popular name of the European
Commission for Democracy Through Law, an activity of the COE. See Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 155, 184
(1997) (discussing the Venice Commission and Web-based activities). The
Commission specifically focuses on enhancing the functioning of new
constitutional courts, through publishing their opinions and otherwise. The Venice
Commission has collected and published the full text of significant constitutional
court opinions in paper formats for several years. It moved these opinions to CDROM and Web media in 1997 The Council has developed a conceptual topology
or thesaurus to index opinions according to their subject matter. See id.
"' The author of this Article has worked with the Commission and with member constitutional courts to use the Internet to improve the efficiency of its
decision-publishing operation.
'"SeeHenryH. Perritt, Jr. & RandolphR. Clarke, ChineseEconomicDevelopment,
Rule ofLaw, and the Internet, 15 GOV'T INFO. Q. 393 (1998).
'03 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
9

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 88

from the European Commission, both available on the Internet.4" No
longer must the drafter of a new media law for Kosovo guess at what will
be acceptable to the COE; she can look at the media law adoptedby Croatia
under COE pressure.
The availability of legislative models increases the likelihood of
harmony among legislative enactments in different sovereign states,
reinforcing economic pressures for such harmonization m order to reduce
trade barriers."'5 Not only does the virtual library make harmonization of
positive law more likely, it also makes harmonization of decisional law
more likely The constitutional courts connected through the Vemce
Commission must decide issues ansing under the European Convention on
Human Rights-a single source of positive human rights law, incorporated
by reference into the constitutions of most states of Central and Eastern
Europe."° Because the constitutional courts m these countries are applying
the same document, and because the kinds of conduct likely to give rise to
human rights claims do not vary substantially from state to state, it is
logical that courts from different states would decide similarly the same
issues under the same law The Venice Commission Project makes it easier
for courts to do this by giving them easy access to constitutional court
decisions of all of the states confronted with the same questions.0 7 Even

"See, e.g., Communicationfromthe Commissionto the Council,the European
Parliament,the EconomicandSocialCommittee, andthe Committee oftheRegions
on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package (visited
Sept. 5, 1998) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/legreg/docs/97236.html>; Law on
Telecommunications (visited Sept. 5, 1998) <http://www.croatia.netlaw/zlm.
htm>
105 In December, 1999, for example, the author was repeatedly informed by
semor governmental andjudicial officials m Ukrame that Ukraine is changing the
entire structure of its law enforcement and prosecutonal system, and the content of
its paternity and child-support law to conform to Council of Europe standards,
hopeful of membership m the Council, as an early precursor to membership in the
European Union ("EU').
1o See The ConstitutionalCourt ofthe Czech Republic (visited Sept. 23, 1998)
<http://www.concourt.cz/anglver/dectsions/doc/4-276-96.html> See generally
David Seymour, The Extension ofthe European Convention on Human Rights to
CentralandEasternEurope:ProspectsandRisks, 8 CONN. J. INT'LL. 243,243-44
(1993) (discussing a common European attitude towards human rights).
07The author has assisted this phenomenon by helping constitutional courts get
connected to the Internet through a project called "ECEULNet." See The
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (visited Sept. 20, 1998)
<http://www.concourt.cz/htm> (acknowledging assistance from ECEULNet).
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though stare decisis does not operate m a strong form m countries without
a common law tradition, as a matter of practical politics, a judge will be
108
pressed to explain deviations from precedent established elsewhere.
Professor Goldsmith doubts the tendency fornational and international
institutions to harmonize substantive law and questions whether judges
dealing with issues already decided by other judges relate their own
decisions to the ones that have already been decided.109 It would be
interesting to test his view-and nme-by systematic analysis of
constitutional court decisions, counting references to decisions m other
countries. The point is not that more information about pertinent judicial
decisions m other jurisdictions inexorably leads to agreement across
jurisdictional lines, but rather that the easier availability of judicial
decisions globally will force judges to articulate the connections between
their decisions, even if deviant, and other decisions. The result is more
reasoned decision making, and a tendency for greater harmony at the
margins. There surely will be disagreement, but at least it will not be
accidental.
C. The InternetAids in Detecting Violations andMobilizingSanctions
The Internet encourages compliance with public international law by
making it easier to detect violations and deviations and to mobilize
sanctions. More and more institutions concerned with implementation of
treaties are using the Internet to publicize national decisions taken under
treaties."0 Moreover, Internet use byNGOs enhances their performance of
the invocation and application functions,"' building on "sophisticated
o8 See, e.g., Michael P Van Alstine, Dynamic TreatyInterpretation,146 U. PA.
L. REv 687, 689-93 (1998) (observing that law has moved from a regime of
statutory interpretation to a regime of interpreting and applying international
models, conventions, and treaties).
1oSee Jack Goldsmith, Regulation ofthe Internet: ThreePersistentFallacies,
73 CHI.-KENTL.REv 1119 (1998).
10 For example, The Hague Conference on private international law is working
to organize a Web site that would publish opinions of national courts applying the
various Hague conventions. Such a Web site would make it much easier for those
interested in interpretation and application of the conventions to follow case law
development See Interview with Hans von Loon, Secretary General of the Hague
Conference (Sept. 1999).
"' These are two ofthe seven functions identified by McDougal, Lasswell, and
Reisman as being performed byNGOs. Invocation is an accusatory role when norm
violations are detected. Application is actual adjudication. The otherfive, discussed
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information networks linking dissidents, sympathetic governments, andthe
media."' 2 Other sections of this Article explain the growing influence of
NGOs in negotiating and promoting adoption of international treaties. '
When violations of international norms are detected by NGOs, they can
focus attention, through Web pages and e-mail, on the violators through
blacklists and organize secondary pressure against those maintaining
relations with the violators. An example of this process at work is the
Organization of Economic Boycott of Myanmar for Human Rights
Violations."1 4 The pressure for Pepsico and others to withdraw from
Myanmar was organized almost entirely by NGOs and private persons
rather than by governments. They used the Internet intensively to organize
the boycott.11 5
Beyondcommunicatingblacklists ofrule violators, thereby facilitating
informal enforcement, NGO rule enforcers can use specialized Web pages
to post results of their investigations to solicit expressions of support and
contribution for formal and informal enforcement actions. They can use the
Web and e-mail to organize mass write-in campaigns to prod political
actors and to commence formal enforcement proceedings.
The Internet empowers nationalities (ethnic interest groups) to accuse
regimes of violating international norms in their treatment of national
minorities. The Armenian Diaspora is generally perceived as largely
determining United States policy toward Armeia, and the Croatian
Diaspora is credited with shaping German policy toward Slovema and
Croatia after they seceded from Yugoslavia.'1 Public reaction to the siege
of Sarajevo, to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, to Serbian suppression of
municipal election results, and to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo are clear
examples. As Serb atrocities against the Albaman minority in Kosovo
escalated during the spring and summer of 1998, the first colorphotographs

in Part I are: intelligence, promotion, prescnption, termination, and appraisal. See
McDougal
et al., supra note 42, at 271. See Charnovitz, supranote 39, at 271-74.
112
Charnovitz, supranote 39, at 264.
3
1 See generally supranotes 50-109 and accompanying text.
14
1 See Some Example: States Who Are Violate [sic] BasicHuman Rights, and
Firms / Company There Are Dealing with Them (visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http://
www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8929/tekst-gb.htm>
1 5 See id.
16

1

See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION

AFTER THE COLD WAR 184-85 (1995) (stating that the German position to

recognize Slovema and Croatia was driven by domestic political pressures,
including those of Croat minority in Germany).
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of murder victims usually were found on Web sites maintained by the
Albanian Diaspora,117 not on CNN.
An nportant part of the new international public law system involves
peacekeeping by international institutions, ripening into international
protectorates as in the case ofKosovo. The Internet facilitates construction
and operation of the machmery necessary for these interventions. In the
case of Kosovo, international legal documents, press releases, and reports
pertaining to the establishment and operation of the Kosovo Force
("KFOR") military and the UN mission in Kosovo civilian authorities are
available on the Internet, making it easier for multinational administration
to function."8
Finally, in certain areas, the growing importance of the Internet as a
political and legal forum and as a marketplace creates leverage for use
against violators of international norms. One reason the debate over reform
of Internet domain name administration is so interesting is that it has the
seeds of a new private mechanism for enforcing private rules in an
international arena. One cannot participate effectively on the Internet
unless one has a domain name. The International Ad Hoc Committee
recommendation envisioned a Web of contractual relationships among
domain name registers pursuant to which all registers will obligate
themselves to revoke the domain name of the Internet user violating the
rules and decisions of institution created under the Committee's recommendations." 9
D. Technology is Not Enough
Technology, on its own, never effects revolution. It is people, using
technology for certain purposes, who alter international law They must be
able to use the Internet to publish law and legal reform proposals; they
must be able to find the law; and they must be able to engage in political
dialogue on the Internet.
7

1"

corn>

See Kosova Freedom (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.kosovafreedom.

See The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://
www.un.org/kosovo/> (containing a Web publication of legal documents, press
releases, and reports pertaining to the U.N. mission in Kosovo).
" See InternetInternationalAdHocCommittee (visited Apr. 18,2000) <http:ll
www.iahc.org/> The IAHC was dissolved on May 1, 1997 However, the
International Ad Hoc Committee proposals for regulation of domain names have
been continued by the Generic Top LevelDomain Memorandum ofUnderstanding.
See gTLO-MoU Website (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.gtld-mou.org/>
18
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The Internet is a vast virtual library, but its virtual shelves will be
empty unless individuals and institutions possessing relevant information
place it on computers connected to the Internet. Moreover, other individuals and institutions must provide a value-added layer of bibliographic
information pointing to primary documentation; the virtual library must
have a classification system and a card catalog. For example, the full text
of treaties must be placed on the Internet, and someone also must organze
a list of treaty titles with pointers to the text of the treaties, which may be
located on a multiplicity of servers. Many of those providing the bibliographic information may choose to standardize typologies or thesauri for
indexing documents, but they need not do so. Others, and they need not be
the designers or nplementers of the classification systems, must translate
foreign language documents.
The Internet facilitates both the publication ofprimary information and
the organization ofbibliographic aids. An Internet server can be established
for as little as $2000. All it takes to publish a document on the server is to
save it in a particular format-Hypertext Markup Language-from either
of the two most popular word processing programs (Microsoft Word or
WordPerfect) and then to "publish it" to a particular directory on the
server-a single step m either of the two most popular Internet Web
browser programs (Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer).
For an institution such as a court that regularly generates textual judgments
or opinions, the process of Web publishing can be automated with a few
sinple scripts that take word processing files for opinions or judgments as
soon as they are released and automatically formats them. Next, they are
published to an appropriate directory on the Web server, automatically
generating indexes and tables of contents as new opinions orjudgments are
added.
The preparation of bibliographic aids also is simple. All one needs is
a concept for organizing the information. For simple content, one publishes
treaty titles or subjects on a Web page and links the entries on the word
processing documents to the Umform Resource Locator ("URLs") for the
full documents. Typically, the linking can be done with one mouse click in
popular word processing programs and Internet Web browsers. The Web
server containing the bibliographic information may be anywhere in the
world and need have no pre-established relationship with the Web server
containing the primary documents.
Free text search engines are available at low cost. These software
modules automatically index every word in a collection of Web files and
permit users to perform a search against the full text of all the documents,
without any human intervention to code the subject matter of new
documents.
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The actions necessary for conferencing on the Internet are somewhat
more sophisticated. The initial step requires someone to set up an e-mail
list for a discussion group on a Web page. For an experienced Webmaster
or unique administrator, this is a five to ten-minute task. Once the list or
discussion space is in place, anyone in the world can participate in a
discussion.
Acceptance of this new reality is growing. In the fall of 1996, the
author encountered many skeptics m Bosnia when he and his students
proposed creating Internet-based libraries of legal materials to hasten
development of rules of law In the fall of 1999, no such skepticism was
evident in Kosovo or Ukraine, where university and government officials
were eager to get Internet connectivity established so access would be
enhanced to Internet databases of legislative and judicial materials they
already were building.
But the cheap printing press, virtual library, and political forum
features of the Internet's Web cannot become realities unless the Internet
is open. The qualities of openness in this sense means that every layer of
the "stack"'e2 of communications and content layers must be free from
artificial restrictions. The Internet's universal, nonpropnetary technical
standards-Internet Protocol ("IP"), Transmission Control Protocol
("TCP"), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol ("SMTP"), Network News
Transfer Protocol ("NNTP"), and Hypertext Transfer Protocol ("ITTP")
-make it easier for the different pieces of an information infrastructure to
fit together. Once connected to the Internet, anyone can send an e-mail
message, post to a news group, or mount a Web page, safe in the assurance
that anyone else connected to the Internet will be able to read them. An
open Internet also means that those wishing to connect to the Internet,
whether primarily to receive information or to establish Web servers and
to publish information, must not be subjected to licensing and market entry
restrictions developed for older technologies such as radio and television
broadcasting and telephone and telegraph services.
The distributed, layered architecture of the Internet must be available
to suppliers and consumers of information. That means two things. First,
centralization of content or communications functions by operation of law
as through exclusive franchises or monopolies, is unnecessary and harmful.
The economies of scale for virtual libraries and electronic publishing are
low Therefore, there are no natural monopolies or efficiencies likely to
120 See infra notes 124-128, explaining the Open Systems Interconnection
("OSr') stack as a model for thinking about different elements of information and
commumcations services.
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result from state granted monopolies. Establishing such monopolies deprive
public and private sectors of the efficiencies naturally available from the
Internet.' Second, it means that competition laws should ensure that those
with monopoly power, however obtained, do not extend it into adjacent
layers of the stack of communications and content. Just as incumbent
telephone companies in the United States and elsewhere must be forced to
unbundle their services and offer connections at any feasible point," so
also must suppliers at content levels be prevented from limiting competition in adjacent markets. This is what the antitrust proceeding against
Microsoft Corporation is all about."z
An open infrastructure, such as described in this section, ensures a
diversity of sources and channels for public information. Equally important, it also ensures marginal cost pricing and rapid introduction of new
technologies.
The open systems interconnection ("osr') stack is familiar to
computer scientists. Published by the International Standards Organization,
OSI is an abstract concept of how different elements of computing systems,
including networks of all kinds, fit together based on seven layers of
function, ranging from electrical signals and hardware plug specifications
at the bottom, or level one, up to the relationship between applications and
operating systems at level seven. The seven layers of the OSI stack 2

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Christopher Lhulier, InformationAccess Rights
Based on InternationalHuman Rights Law, 45 BUFF L. REV 899 (1997); Henry
H. Perritt, Jr., Should Local GovernmentsSell Local SpatialDatabasesThrough
State Monopolies?, 35 JURIMETRICS 449 (1995) [hereinafter Perritt, Should Local
GovernmentsSellLocalSpatialDatabases];Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources ofRights
to Access Public Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 179 (1995)
[hereinafter Perritt, Sources ofRights].
" See FCC Promotes Local Telecommunications Competition, Report No. CC
99-41, available at 1999 WL 717251 (Sept. 15, 1999) (rules on unbundling of
network elements); European Commission White Paper on Opening Up
Telecommunications Networks (2000).
1 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F Supp. 2d 1, republishedat 84 F
Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1999).
124 Layer 1, the physical layer, defines the electrical and mechamcal interface,
including number of pins, cable type, and electrical levels (voltage and current). It
is a useful category for evaluating the physical communications infrastructure in
any country
Layer 2, the data link layer, covers link setup and error control. It deals with
frames. This is a useful category for evaluating switching technology
Layer 3, the network layer, deals with establishing virtual circuits. It defines
121

1999-2000]

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

how packets are assembled, disassembled, and routed. It s a useful category for
reviewing data framing standards and facilities, and Internet backbone service.
Historically, "retail" Internet service providers leased point-to-point
telephone lines from their points-of-presence to transit networks to which
they were connected through routers. At their points of presence, they
provided multiple dial-up telephone numbers backed up by modems and
terminal servers to aggregate traffic. Transit providers leased highercapacity point-to-point telephone lines to link routers to which "retail"
Internet service providers were connected. The Internet thus was layered on
top of the telephone system and constituted a combination ofrouters, leased
telephone lines, dial-up telephone points-of-presence, and associated
organizational and human infrastructure to provide training, service, and
maintenance.
Now, the Internet conceptually is more complicated for several reasons.
Dial-up lines often are virtual, constituting an entitlement to pass traffic
through frame relay or SMDS connections with local exchange and
mterexchange telephone carriers. These connections often are digital and
involve some packet switching. Thus, rather than sending IP packets over
a simple electrical connection (in the case ofa dedicated point-to-point line)
or over an analog telephone circuit (as m the case of a dial-up line), IP
packets often move over an underlying digital network using other kinds of
packets or cells.
Second, the ways in which customers can access a "retail" [Internet
Service Provider] ISP have become more complex. ISDN, DSL, and cable
modem customers bypass modems and pass digital traffic directly into an
ISDN switch DSLAM (for DSL), or telco/cable mode and from there into
a router for the ISP Increasingly, retail ISPs and telephone companies are
arranging for the ISP to bypass the local office telephone switch for large
customers, thereby giving the ISP the advantage of the unbundling of
telephone service mandated by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and
reducing the likelihood of congestion m telephone company switches.
HENRY H. PERRr1T, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY § 1.2A
(Supp. 2000).
Layer 3 (the network layer) includes standards for packetizing and
depacketizing data in packet switched networks and also includes standards for
routing packets. Layer 4 (the transport layer) includes information on reassembling
packets and checking for errors. These two layers correspond roughly, to the IP
standard and TCP standard, respectively. TCP and IP are the two standards or
protocols that define the Internet.
Layer 4, the transport layer, is concerned with definmg quality of service and
is closely integrated with layer 5. Layer 4 is a useful category for reviewing
Internet service.
Layer 5, the session layer, relates the logical user interface to the com-
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embody the idea that subsystems making up a computer network can be
disaggregated from each other. Each layer is defined in terms of the
services it requires from the layers below it, its internal operations
(protocols), and the services it provides the layers above. If clear specifications exist for the functions to be performed by each subsystem or "layer"
in the OSI stack, and if protocols exist defining the interface between
layers, computer programmers and hardware manufacturers can focus their
energies on one or more subsystems or layers without having to provide all
of the layers. 12 This gives the benefits of specialization to participants the
computer networks market.
The OSI stack has conceptual powerbeyond what is needed by network
engineers. The same basic ideas can be extended beyond the computer
programs and electrical connections making up the OSI stack itself. One
can imagme the same kind of stack of layers in content and information
access features. 26 The Web has raised consciousness about that kind of
layering of information value.
The stack model expresses the idea instantiated by the Internet's Web,
that the elements of an information infrastructure can be unbundled.
mumcations layers; it establishes and manages communications paths or channels
between two communicating applications processes; it establishes and releases
connections.
Layer 6, the presentation layer, deals with data representation, data transformations on messages received from the application layer, compression, and data
conversion and formatting, e.g., EBCDIC (Extended Binary-Coded Decimal
Interchange Code, used by IBM instead of ASCII) to ASCII. This is a useful
category for considering human language and character translation issues.
Layer 7, the application layer, serves applications programs through service
calls, providing file transfer, document transfer, and electronic mail. The
application layer usually passes an address in the form of a service request to layer
5, the session layer, wich maps addresses into a form that is acceptable to lower
layers. This is a useful category for considering the availability of Internet
applications such as e-mail and Web services. See Webopedia (visited May 11,
2000)
<http://webopedia.mtemet.com/TERM/O/OSI.html>
2
' s See Webopedia, supra note 124.
' See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., FederalElectronicInformation Policy, 63 TEMP
L. REV. 201 (1990) (describing stack of added value features); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Formatand ContentStandardsfor the ElectronicExchange ofLegal Information,
33 JURIMETRICS 265 (1993); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., MarketStructuresforElectronic
Publishingand Electronic Contractingon a National Research and Education
Network: Defining Added Value, in BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

NETWORK (Brian Kahm ed., 1992).
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Implementation of the OSI stack and the protocol stack ideas free up
positive network externalities inherent in lower levels. Otherwise, those
levels are locked into competing proprietary islands. The result of general
adoption of the OSI conceptual model was a tipping-and then a
stampede-to IP, 27TCP and then HTIP after the network externalities
became apparent.
But competitive access to the conduit is not enough. The Internet will
do little if there is no relevant content on it. The same principles of
competitive access and opposition to monopolythat are appropriate forthe
telecommunications infrastructure also are appropriate for the information
infrastructure. While copyright and other forms of intellectual property
have an important role to play in private creation of information, they are
irrelevant for public information, which is created as a public duty imposed
on lawmakers and judges.
Realization of the Internet's potential to affect development, acceptance, and enforcement of new public international law depends upon
transparency Preparatory work, actual drafting of treaty language, the
political process of treaty ratification, and exposure of deviations and
violations all depend upon the relevant information being freely available
on the Web. When participants in any of these processes refuse to make
information held by them freely available, seeking to extract revenue from
those wishmg access to the documents or seeking to prevent others from redisseminating documents, the Internet's potential is thwarted. Almost
anyone can frustrate transparency-governments, NGOs, universities. In
many instances, the incentives to build support for one's position will
overcome such rent-seeking behavior. In other instances, however, selfinterested econonic behavior by public institutions must be overcome by
freedom of information legal principles which should not be trumped by
exaggerated copyright interpretations protecting basic political
2
documents.1 1
Unfortunately, not all governments make their information resources
available for electronic access. The reluctance of some governments stems
from the commumst era in which public access to information about
government activities either was unnecessary or was actively opposed. In
other cases, the motivation is not to discourage public participation in
government, but to make money Many government institutions recognize
127 See generally JOHN LARMOUTH, UNDERSTANDING OSI (1994).

See Romano Prodi, President of European Commission, Statement issued
week of Dec. 6, 1999 (identifying Internet publication of legal documents as a
major priority of European Commission, to improve transparency).
'1
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the economic value of government information m electromc form and also
that monopolists can extract more revenue by mamtammg their monopolies
and discouraging competition. Accordingly, they set up government-run or
government-sponsored monopolies to sell access to their information
resources, blocking access by others. 12 9
State-sponsored monopolies over government information are
undesirable for a number of reasons. Monopolies make it easier for
censorship to occur. Monopolies usually perpetuate older information
technologies because monopolists have no economic incentive to introduce
new technologies, thus depriving consumers of the benefits of new
technology Monopolies rarely serve the needs of particular consuming
communities as well as a competitive market structure can serve them. This
is because no monopolist can understand and cater to the needs of
specialized communities as well as serve a designer and producer who
specializes more narrowly
Accordingly, information policy should commit to and encourage a
diversity of sources and channels for government information.1 30 This
policy is best implemented by a legal framework that grants anyone a right
of access to basic government information and also gives everyone a
privilege to publish that information in electromc form or otherwise.13 ' In
See Perritt, ShouldLocal Governments SellLocal SpatialDatabases,supra
note 121, at 454-55; Perritt, Sources of.Rights, supra note 121, at 184 (explaining
and criticizing agency temptations to set up state monopolies over government
information).
130A good example of a commitment to apolicy of diversity is expressed in the
PaperworkReductionActAmendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163
(May 22, 1995), which was amended by 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2000), to read as
follows:
(d) With respect to information dissemination, each agency shall(1)ensure that the public has timely and equitable access to the agency's
public information, including ensuring such access through(A) encouraging a diversity of public and private sources for
information based on government public .information;
(B) in cases m winch the agency provides public information
maintained in electroic format, providing timely and equitable access
to the underlying data (in whole or in part); and
(C) agency dissemination of public information in an efficient,
effective, and economical manner
Id. at 174.
' The Paperwork Reduction Act amendments to 44 U.S.C. § 3506(d), appropriately continue:
129
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some countries, such rights and privileges are deeply imbedded m current
law 132
In the United States, this entitlement is codified in the Freedom of
Information Act, 33 and in many similar state statutes. In Sweden, the
entitlement is guaranteedbythe Constitution. 34 The European Commission
recently published a Green Paper on public sector information, under a
mandate of the Maastricht Treaty requiring that the functions of European
35
governmental institutions become more transparent.
The basic underpmnmgs of an international freedom of information
act are visible m the guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom
36
of access in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.
They should be extended by decisional law and by national inplementation of the core principles of the American Freedom of Information
Act.' 37
Freedom of information and competitive access to the Internet are
important new international human rights, and they should be added to the
inventory of values promoted by United States foreign policy and by
human rights organizations.

With respect to information dissemmation, each agency shall
(4) not, except where specifically authorized by statute(A) establish an exclusive, restricted, or other distribution
arrangement that interferes with timely and equitable availability of
public information to the public;
(B) restrict or regulate the use, resale, or redissemmation of public
information by the public;
(C) charge fees or royalties for resale or redissemmation of public
mformation; or
(D) establish user fees for public information that exceed the cost of
dissemination.
Id.
See nfra notes 133-134.
"I Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
'34 See SWED. CONST. 1994, Instrument of Government, ch. 2 (Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms), art. 1(2) (guaranteeing freedom of information); Freedom
of the Press Act, ch. 2 (On the Public Nature of Official Documents), art. 2
(guaranteeing access to official documents).
131 See European Umbrella Organisationfor GeographicInformation (visited
June 7,2000) <http://www.eurogi.org/pubinfo>
36
' See generally Perritt & Lhulier, supra note 121, at 906-11.
, 37 See id. at 903-06, 911-13.
132
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IV. THE INTERNET CHANGES THE BALANCE OF
INTERESTS THAT DETERMINES THE OUTCOMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Changing the machinery of international law without changing the
underlying interests 3 ' does not necessarily change outcomes. Formulation
of international law and imposing sanctions on its violators is determined
as much by international politics as by the capacity of legal institutions.
But the Internet also changes the balance of interests in international
politics. Thomas L. Friedman's book, TheLexus andthe Olive Tree, asserts
that the benefits of global commerce will be difficult for nation-states to
resist.13 9 They must choose between maintaining border controls and all the
traditional attributes of sovereignty, and allowing globalization to sweep
their countries, reducing sovereignty Pressure on governments to
participate in global markets is intensifying because the information
revolution makes the general public in every country far more likely to
know about the benefits of globalization. 140
The Internet intensifies this new mass interest in two ways: in the way
Friedman emphasizes, as the channel through which mass pressure to
reduce barrers and allow participation builds; and as a source of wealth
itself, giving nse to a new interest group. 41 The Internet and the explosion
in electronic commerce have spawned a new set of companies and
entrepreneurs who exercise increasing political influence wherever they are
active. They exert pressure on international institutions and on domestic
governments to remove barriers to realization of the Internet's potential.
They were not part of the political equation ten years ago, and the addition
of their voices can change the outcomes in some debates over the content
of international law, even as the voices of their customers are raised in
Friedman's paradigm to make sure their countries are open to all forms of
42
international commerce, including e-commerce
But the Internet also empowers interests related to the olive tree side
ofFnedman's vision.143 Even as the Internet offers a new global market for
"Interests" is used m the sense of an advantage or benefit, as in a special
interest.
139 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999).
'40 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
14 See id. The title of Fnedman's book, The Lexus andthe Olive Tree, signifies
tension between the attractiveness of globalization, signified by the global demand
for Lexus automobiles, and the forces of ethmc purity and nationalist sentiment,
138
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learning about and acquiring goods and services produced outside one's
own country, it also facilitates organization and expression by new
nationalities and interest groups. For example, at one point in the Kosovo
conflict, the Albanian Diaspora had organized more than 10,000 e-mail
accounts for members of the Diaspora and refugees from Kosovo, enabling
them to crystallize their sentiments in solidarity In addition, most of the
protest against the WTO in Seattle was organized through the Internet.
While the Internet changes the interest balance in favor of outcomes
promoting the free flow of international commerce and political sentiment,
it also empowers those who would oppose it. One cannot with confidence
predict the outcomes of the new interplay of new interests in international
politics. But it clearly would be a mistake to assume that only the
machinery has changed and not the substantive determinants of international politics and therefore the ultimate content of international law
V

THE INTERNET IS GIVING RISE TO

NEW BODIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Internet not only improves the functioning of the public international legal system; it invites the extension ofthat system. There is growing
recognition that traditional forms of regulation are unsuitable for many of
the economic and political transactions that occur on the Internet. 44 In
some cases, subjecting Internet activities to state-based regulation will raise
transaction costs to the point that desirable activities will not occur; in other
cases, important public policy interests cannot be enforced effectively over
Internet content originating in other states. Erection of new public law
frameworks, encouraging and channeling private ordering (self-regulation)
can address some of these problems, and pressure grows to develop such
frameworks.
A. The Battle Between Public and PrivateOrdenng
Why does the Internet encourage greater reliance on private ordering
as part of the international legal system? Because of the differences
between the Internet and older technologies, people have been thinking
seriously about whether traditional jurisdictional rules are adequate for the
Internet or whethernew approaches are necessary The Internet's inherently

signified by battles over apparently worthless land with a few olive trees in the
Middle East.
144 See LAWRENCE LEsSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE

(1999).
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global character makes it difficult to localize conduct and effects, and
localization is the traditional lynchpm ofpnvate international law doctrines
for determining prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. The Internet's
low barriers to entry encourage participation in transnational commerce and
political affairs by millions of individuals and small enterprises which,
before the Internet, were confined to national markets and forums.
Statistics presented by the National Consumers League for 1997 show that
Internet fraud complaints involving non-United States and Canada
consumers ranked eighth, just after Illinois consumers and just ahead of
Virginia consumers. 45
David R. Johnson and David Post sayCyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally
significant (online) phenomena and physical location. The rise of the
global computer network is destroying the link between geographical
location and: (1) thepower of local governments to assert control over
online behavior, (2) the effects ofonline behavior on individuals or things;
(3) the legitimacy of a local sovereign's efforts to regulate global
phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of
wuch sets of rules apply. The Net thus radically subverts the system of
rule-making based on borders between physical spaces, at least with
respect to the claim that Cyberspace should naturally be governed by
146
territorially defined rules.
In other words, the international legal system's traditional rules for
jurisdiction depend on localization of conduct or harm. The Internet
challenges all three lands of jurisdiction: prescriptive jurisdiction,
adjudicative jurisdiction, and enforcement jurisdiction, because it is
difficult to localize legally relevant conduct occurring on the Internet. Selfregulation can help with all three challenges because it lessens the pressure
to localize behavior.
With respect to prescriptive jurisdiction, if a private group agrees on
a code of good practice, that is a kind of legislative act. It is a form of
See NationalConsumers League InternetFraudWatch: Top 20 Consumer
Locations 1997 (visited Feb. 4,2000) <http://www.fraud.org/graphics/1997cons.
gif>
'46 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV 1367, 1370 (1996). "Cyberspace" refers to the
virtual space in which personal, political, and commercial relationships can be
established. It is a superset of the Internet, including also private electromc
networks using other protocols. See id.
i4S
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prescription and it is inherently transnational, at least to the extent that the
membership of the group is transnational.
With respect to adjudicative jurisdiction, private dispute resolution
such as arbitration can be inherently transnational. International commercial arbitration under the New York Convention 47 is a prominent example.
Moreover, private dispute resolution is not limited to arbitration or
mediation. In fact, some new models for private dispute resolution being
employed include credit card charge-back mechamsms, dispute prevention
and resolution systems unilaterally adoptedby private Internet mtermediaries. 148 For example, eBay offers an escrow system, an insurance system, a
dispute resolution system in the form of mediation, and a mechanism for
a land of consumer blacklisting of merchants who misbehave.
Domestic United States systems forpatient care disputes with managed
care companies also represent a model with potential application in the
international context. There is a long history in health care delivery in the
United States of a hybrid system of dispute resolution that begins within a
private entity such as an insurance company and eventually ends up in an
appeal process in a public entity Such structures provide the simplicity of
a private mechanism at the first level but also have some type of appellate
review or control by public institutions.
To be credible, private self-regulatory schemes have to produce
enforceable decisions. Enforceability implicates the concept of enforcementjurisdiction. Self-regulation works only to the extent that government
permits it to work, as opposed to viewing private enforcement action as
defamatory orviolative of antitrust laws. Self-regulatory schemes must be
linked to public law and to public authorities. When such linkage exists,
there is the possibility for real protection because private groups can
legislate and resolve disputes privately, and then to the extent that it seems
appropriate, rely on the government apparatus for enforcement.
B. Models From Other Types oflnternationalRegulation
The Internet's global characteristic causes it to be a target of international regulation similar in some respects to the targets of law of the sea
and the subject matter of outer space regulation. Its low economic barriers

"4Convention on Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Awards (1958)
[hereinafter
New York Convention].
4
' ' See eBay: YourPersonalTradingCommunity (visited Feb. 4,2000) <http:ll
www.ebay.com>; seeHenryH. Perritt, Jr.,DisputeResolutionin Cyberspace,OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2000).
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of entry, however, distinguish it sharply from outer space regulation and
moderately from law of the sea.
The brief review of law of the sea and outer space regulation that
follows offers some models for regulation when localization of activity
within a state is difficult or Impossible. These may be useful starting points
for thinking about international Internet regulation. On the other hand,
these regulatory regimes focus on state actors rather than private actors,
and thus make them unsuitable conceptual models for Internet regulation
of many thousands of private actors.
1. Maritime Treatiesas a Model
In 1609, Hugo Grotius postulated that no state legitimately could
exercise jurisdiction over the open sea. 149 Under customary international
law, national jurisdiction was limited to territorial waters. Controversies
concerned state jurisdiction over foreign vessels found within their
territorial waters and state jurisdiction over natural resources such as fish
found within the territorial waters. International law acknowledged state
jurisdiction over fishing m territorial waters,150 and developedprinciples for
defining territorial waters.' 5' As interstate ocean commerce increased,
international law recognized that the law of the nationality of vessels
governed activities on board,"' "on the pragmatic basis that there must be
some law on shipboard, that it cannot change at every change of waters,
and no experience shows a better rule than that of the state that owns
her."' 53 Another pragmatic rule allowed free passage of warships in time of
peace through straits used for international navigation between two parts
of the high seas even though the passage occurred through territorial
waters.154

149See
CoMPET

HUGO GROTIUs, MARE LIBERUM; SIVE, DE IURE QUOD BATAVIS
AD INDICANA COMMERCIA DISSERTATIO

(1609).

UNCLOS, supra note 13, art 2 (recogmzmg state jurisdiction over
territorial waters).
'' See Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18) (reviewing and upholding the Norwegian method for calculating the extent of territorial sea).
112 See Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) ("Wildenhus'
Case"- territorial sea jurisdiction relinquished in favor of law of the flag of foreign
vessels except as to activities that threaten "peace of the port" or "public peace").
5 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953).
' See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1 (Apr. 9) (finding Corfu
Channel to constitute a strait through which free passage is permitted).
151See
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Controversy continued well into the twentieth century over the extent
of territorial waters-and hence of state jurisdiction. One of the most
illuminating alternative rules was the "cannon-shot" rule 55 which defined
the extent of territorial waters by the range of a cannon fired from shore,
thus clearly defining jurisdiction in terms of the practical extent of state
power.

56

Article 33 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") reconciles the competing interests by recogmzmg a
"contiguous zone," extending no further than twenty-four nautical miles
from shore,157 within which
the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, mugration or
sanitary law and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) pumsh infringement of the above laws and regulations
15 8
committed within its territory or territorial sea.
Outside territorial, contiguous, and "exclusive economic zones," the
high seas are open and free to all states, 159 and in those seas warships and
noncommercial ships are entitled to "complete immunity" from interference by any other state.' 6 Private commercial ships are subject to boarding
by warships and law-enforcement ships when authorized by the flag state
or if there is reason to suspect the boarded ship of piracy,16' slave trading,
unauthorized broadcasting, reason to suspect that the boarded ship is
without nationality, or reason to suspect that the boarded ship is of the
same nationality as the boarding ship. 62
'-'-See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 90, at 1005.
56
'1
See

Koh, The 1998 FrankelLecture, supra note 73, at 636 (explaining the
cannon-shot
rule).
7
'1 See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 33(2).
15 Id. art. 33(1).
159 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 521 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (recognizing freedom of navigation, overflight,
fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands,
installations, and structures, and of scientific research).
6oSee id. § 522(1).
1 Cf United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (1 th Cir. 1985) (allowing seizure by the United States Coast Guard of a vessel suspected of drug
smuggling outside customs waters under the "protective principle" of prescriptive
jurisdiction).
62
1

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 522(2) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
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UNCLOS recognizes the role of international dispute resolution
machinery to the law of the sea. 163 Article 286 of UNCLOS provides:
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been
reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party
to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this
section.

164

Article 287 of UNCLOS allows disputants to satisfy the requirements
of article 286 through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the
International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal constituted m accordance
with Annex VII, or a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII 65 for one or more of the categories of disputes specified
therein. The means of dispute resolution must be specified at the time of
ratification ofthe Convention. 66 The general dispute resolution procedures

contemplate the possibility of participation by non-state parties. 167
Among other things, the ITLOS and the alternative dispute resolution
bodies expressly have the power to order the release of vessels that have
163 See Louis B. Sohn, PeacefulSettlement ofDisputesin Ocean Conflicts:Does

UNCLOSfIIIPointthe Way', 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1983) (arguing that
if parties to the convention retain power of unilateral interpretation, the text of
convention would lack stability, certainty, and predictability).
'6 UNCLOS, supranote 13, art. 286. Article 297 ofUNCLOS excepts disputes
over sovereign rights to living resources (fish) within a state's exclusive economic
zone, and article 298 allows signatories, at their option, to except from the dispute
resolution obligation disputes concerning military and law enforcement activities.
See id. art. 297(3)(b) and art. 298(1)(b).
165 The United States opted for special arbitral tribunals. "In accordance with
article 30 (4) of the Agreement, the Government of the United States of America
declares that it chooses a special arbitral tribunal to be constituted m accordance
with Annex VIII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 for the settlement of disputes pursuant to Part VIII of the
Agreement." Id.
'6 See OceansandLaw ofthe Sea (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/nclos/closmdx.htm> The specified dispute resolution institutions have
jurisdiction over "any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention." UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 288.
" See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 291 (state parties and other parties as
agreed); Statute for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, art. 20(1)
(state parties); art. 20(2) (other parties as agreed), Annex VI, Law of the Sea
Convention.
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been detained.' 68 The rules of the tribunal evidence its formal, adjudicatory
69

character.1

ITLOS requires that pleadings be submitted in electronic form,170 and
allows service of other papers to be made electronically 171 ITLOS also
publishes its judgments on the Web."
The deep seabed regime of UNCLOS1' is particularly significant in
terms of its implications for Internet regulation. That regime includes an
77
76
75
Authority' 74 comprising an Assembly,1 a Council, and a Secretariat.
In addition, the regime includes an Enterprise' 7" consisting of an mternational busmess organization empowered to directly undertake deep seabed
resource development. Significantly, the dispute settlement machinery for
deep seabed development extends standing to non-state entities, 179 and
rulemalang does not require consensus or unanmity by signatories. 8
Adoption of UNCLOS is regarded as a watershed m the development of
public international law because UNCLOS is viewed as evidence of the
See UNCLOS, supranote 13, art. 292.
See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Rules of the Tribunal (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Rules-Tribunal.
htm>
"ISee InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea: Guidelines Concerning
the Preparation and Presentation of Cases Before the Tribunal, Written
Proceedingspara. 1 (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/
Guidelines.htm>
1 See id. at Written Proceedingspara. 10.
' See InternationalTribunalforthe Law ofthe Sea: The MV "Saiga" (No. 2)
Case (July 1999) (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/
JudgE.htm>
173 See UNCLOS, supra note 13, arts. 133-9 1.
'4See id. arts. 156-85.
'"See
id. arts. 159-60.
176 See id. arts. 161-65.
'"See id. arts. 166-69.
18 See id. art. 170.
'7 See id. art. 187(c) (extending the jurisdiction of The Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber of ITLOS to "natural orjuridical persons" with nationality of signatories
when sponsored by signatories). Article 190 of UNCLOS allows "sponsoring
states" to participate in proceedings in which natural or juridical persons are
parties. See id. art. 190.
'oSee id. art. 155, para. 4 (allowing adoption of amendments by three-to-four
vote of Review Conference to be submitted to states parties for ratification;
ratification by three-fourths of members).
168
69

1
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thus making it bmding-m a

2. Space Law as a Model
The law of outer space182 includes, among other things, regulation of
communications satellites, and the closely-associated law of international
telecommunications. Like the Internet, international telecommunications
constitutes an international resource-to be used for all ofmanknd,8 3 and
a scarce resource-to be preserved.8I 4
The International Telecommunication Union ("ITU") is intended to:
(a) effect allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration
of radio frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference
between radio stations of different countries;
(b) coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio
stations of different countries and to improve the use made of the radio
frequency spectrum;
(c) coordinate efforts with a view to harmonizing the development of
telecommunications facilities, notably those using space techniques, with
a view to full advantage being taken of their possibilities;
(d) foster collaboration among its Members with a view to the
establishment of rates at levels as low as possible consistent with an
efficient service and taking into account the necessity for maintaining
independent financial adminstration of telecommumcation on a sound
basis;
181 See

Bernard H. Oxman, Law of the Sea, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW

309 (1997).

The two pertinent intemational agreements are the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, openedfor signature Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [heremafter Outer SpaceTreaty], andRegistration ofObjects
Launched into Outer Space, openedfor signatureJan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695,
adopted by the General Assembly in GA Res. 3235 (XXIX) (entered intoforce
Sept.8 15, 1976) [hereinafter Outer Space Registration Convention].
1 1 See International Telecommunication Union Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28
U.S.T.
2495, art. 1 [hereinafter ITU Convention].
84
' See Id.art. 33. The Nairobi Convention was convened in an attempt to incorporate the desires of developing countries into article 33 of the ITU Convention.
See id.
182
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(e) foster the creation, development and improvement oftelecommumcation equipment and networks in developing countries by every means
at its disposal, especially its participation in the appropriate programmes
of the United Nations;
(f) promote the adoption of measures for ensuring the safety of life
through the cooperation of telecommunication services;
(g) undertake studies, make regulations, adopt resolutions, formulate
recommendations and opinions, and collect and publish information
5
concerning telecommunication matters.S
These purposes are similar to the purposes of Internet domain name
regulation m that they focus on technical issues, maximization of resource,
and non-interference. An example of these purposes is the Outer Space
Registration Convention" 6 which provides that each signatory must
maintain registry of objects launched into space,8 7 and obligates launching
states to register with UN objects launched into orbit or beyond."'
While some of the problems addressed by space law are similar to
those presented by international Internet law, there also are important
differences. Satellite communication, like the Internet, inherently transcends national boundaries. With both systems of law there is a need to
recognize and allow the power of technology to be available, while at the
same time respecting the prerogatives of traditional sovereignty
On the other hand, important differences may make it difficult to adapt
space law concepts for international Internet regulation. For one thing, as
earlier sections ofthis Article have noted, the economic barriers to entry on
the Internet are much less than the economic barriers to entry for satellite
communications. One need not procure satellite launch services from a
country that has a satellite launch capability in order to establish a presence
on the Internet. That means greater proliferation of sources of Internet
content, making any form of international regulation more difficult than for
satellite-based activities. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive how more
than one or two sovereign states have the physical capability to exert power
over satellite-based activities. That is not true with the Internet. While
Internet border controls are not well understood, may be difficult to
establish, and may serve to isolate a country by closing it down from the
electronic commerce and political discourse of the Web, Internet border

ITU Convention, supra note 183, art. 4.
Outer Space Registration Convention, supranote 182.
1 See id. art. 2.
188 See id. art. 3.
185

i86
87
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controls are not inpossible. Government-based routers can be established
as firewalls for Internet communications outside the country Internet
intermediaries may be threatened with strict punishment if they allow
forbidden content to enter the country, thus mducing them to figure out
their own border control systems. Further, criminal penalties focused on an
individual citizen can be reinforced by the Internet tracking capabilities. If
the citizen knows that his access of forbidden content will leave a certain
trail that can be followed by law enforcement authorities, he is more likely
to comply with domestic regulations prohibiting access to content at the
individual user level.
None of these things are possible with satellite systems. Accordingly,
the practical underpinnings of space law-the virtual impossibility of
applying traditional coercive measures to enforce national law-are not
characteristic of the Internet. Because of the greater practicability of
enforcing traditional law through traditional coercive measures, there is
less incentive for nation-states worried about the Internet to agree to an
international treaty along the lines expressed by the space treaties.
3. Limited Usefulness ofMaritime and Space Law Models
Both the law of the sea and the space law models are intergovernmental
that most of the work of rulemaking, treaty
interpretation, enforcement, and operations will be conducted by traditional
international organizations. Relatively little role is contemplated for the
private sector in these models, with the exception of state-designated
entities in both regimes.
As the next section of this Article shows, other approaches are
conceivable for the Internet, involving relatively thin intergovernmental
(public law) frameworks within which private ordering can do most of the
rulemaking, adjudication, enforcement, andoperationalwork. Thesehybrid
structures offer the advantages of greater flexibility and decentralization
available through private ordering, while tying private ordering to public
lawto enhance legitimacy, political acceptability, and enforcement through
state-based coercion when necessary
in character. They contemplate

C. Matricesfor HybridRegulation
Changes in information technology, including but not limited to the
Internet, are causing the development of new public law structures for
public and private regulation of commerial and political activities making
use of these technologies. Additionally, they also are causing the redesign
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and streamlining of traditional public law institutions such as the ITU and
the WIPO.
The Internet is encouraging exploration of new knds of public
international law matrices for private self-ordering because of the
difficulties of regulating the Internet through conventional state-oriented
means. 8 9 Redesign of existing institutions enlarges their limited rulemaking power, and open them up to limited forms of participation by
nongovernmental entities such as service providers.
The new institutional frameworks are more significant because they
represent hybrid forms of international regulation, providing public law
frameworks for private ordering. The three most advanced examples
involve negotiation of a safe harbor for personal data moving from Europe
to the United States, the establishment of an internationally controlled
private corporationto regulate Internet domam names and addresses,' and
rapidly spreading credit card charge-back mechanisms.
The new public international matrices for private ordering include
choice of law rules and rules for adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction,
treaties such as the New York Convention for enforcing arbitration awards
and a proposed state convention on the enforcement of civil judgments.
They also include immunities for actors in private ordering systems, such
as immunities that shield members of a self-regulating organization from
antitrust liability and immunities that shield accusers and decision makers
in private adjudicatory mechanisms from defamation liability or liability
for intentional interference with business relations.' 91
1. Subsidiarity Will Receive Increasing
Attention as a Way of BalancingGlobal andLocal Concerns
Much needs to be done intellectually to sort out those matters that cannot
be dealt with effectively at a more local level from those that will drift to
international, political, and legal institutions. In this regard, careful analysis
ofthe federalism in the United States would be instructive, not so much from
CompareJohnson & Post, supranote 146, with Goldsmith, supra note 109,
andPerritt, Sources ofRights, supranote 121.
'o See The Internet CorporationForAssigned Names andNumbers (visited
May 11, 2000) <http://www.icann.org>; see also infra notes 230-258 and
accompanying text.
"I'See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town HallDemocracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 469 (1997)
[hereinafter Perritt, CyberspaceSelf-Government].
189
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the perspective of the Commerce Clause and preemption, as from the
perspective ofpolitical will to act nationally as opposedto locally. Europeans
refer to the preference for local resolution of issues as subsidiarity.'
The Internet not only reinforces other phenomena encouraging the
development of international law; it facilitates government at the local level.
One problem with earlier twentieth century information technologies, such
as television and radio broadcasting, is that their economies of scale forced
public affairs information to larger political units. The evening news covers
Washington, D.C. more easily than it covers the state representative district.
An ordinary citizen is more likely to see the President ofthe United States on
television than the mayor. The greater visibility of higher levels of government encourages reliance on those higher levels to help solve problems. The
Internet changes that. Its lower barriers to entry mean that an alderman can
have a Web page that looks just as functional and just as accessible as the
Web page of the President of the United States. As lower levels of government begin to take advantage ofthe Internet's potential, political underlings
can become more relevant in the lives oftheir constituents even as power on
certain issues is shifting upward from nation-states to international institutions, and from national political organizations to international ones.
Subsidiarity relieves political pressure to resist adherence to international
norms. Greater possibilities for effective government at the local level mean
that local concerns can be accommodated more completely, thus reducing
alienation from more remote legal and political institutions. In other words,
the Internet is likely to strengthen local and international law, probably at the
expense of national, state-based law. Some early glimmers of this effect are
evident from efforts at the state level in the United States to influence
93
international developments.
2. Critenafor Self-Regulation-Privacy
The European Umon's ("EU") directive on data protection, effective
on October 25, 1998,194 prohibits transfer ofpersonal data outside ofthe EU
92

See Antomo F Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: InstitutionalComity in National
Security, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 322 n.82, 376 & n.324 (1998) (explaining the
significance of subsidiarity m European law).
93
See National For. Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.) (declaring
the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct 525 (1999);
David R. Schmahmann et al., Off the Precipice:MassachusettsExpands its Foreign
PolicyExpeditionFromBurmato Indonesta,30 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'LL. 1021,1022
(1997).
"9 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, art. 32, 1995 O.3. (L 281) 31, 49 [hereinafter European
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except to countries that provide an "adequate" level of privacy
protection. 195 Because the United States has a patchwork of industry-

Privacy Directive] (requiring member states to adopt legislation conforming to
terms of Directive).
"' See id. art. 25(1). "In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular
their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data." Id.art. 1(1).
"Member States shall, within the limits ofthe provisions ofthis Chapter, determine
more precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal data is
lawful." Id. art. 5.
The Directive imposes duties with respect to data quality (article 6). The
Directive allows processing of data only when: (1) the data subject has
unambiguously consented; (2) processing is necessary to protect vital interests of
the data subject; (3) "processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority;" or (4) "processing
is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller
or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the
data subject which require protection under Article 1(1)." Id. art. 7 The Directive
permits information to be given to the data subject (articles 10-11), and allows the
data subject a right of access to data (article 12) and a right to object to certain data
contents (articles 14-15). It obligates data "controllers" to assure confidentiality and
security of processing (articles 16-17), and obligates them to notify the supervisory
authority when engaging in processing outside blanket authorization obtained
through registration (articles 18-21).
It also establishes a Working Party on the Protection of Individuals (article 30)
and a Committee (article 31) to assist member states and the European Commission
on harmonization and adaptation of the Directive.
The geographic scope of the Directive is specified as follows:
Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts
pursuant to this Directive to the processing of personal data where:
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an
establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State;
when the same controller is established on the territory of several
Member States, he must take the necessary measures to ensure that each
of these establishments complies with the obligations laid down by the
national law applicable;
(b) the controller is not established on the Member State's territory,
but in a place where its national law applies by virtue of international
public law;
(c) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for
purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment,
automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member
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specific, state, federal, and private self-regulatory approaches, itis not clear
that transfers of data to the United States would be permitted by EU
authorities. 196 The Directive establishes two administrative bodies to assist
the Commission in implementing the directive: a Working Party197 and a
Committee.' 98 The Working Party has only advisory powers, while the
Committee can block Commission action. As a practical matter, the
Working Party is more militant than the Committee in asserting the
prerogatives of member state data protection authorities:
While prohibiting data transfers originating in Europe does not, in a
formal sense, contravene international law principles of prescriptive,
adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction,199 the practical effect of such a
prohibition is to disrupt international commerce. The European Commission ("EC") and the United States government have been engaged m
developing a hybrid regulatory scheme to avoid this disruption."' The
discussions resulted in the issuance, on April 19, 1999, of draft "International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles" by the United States Department of
Commerce "under its statutory authority to foster, promote, and develop
international commerce." 20 1 Under the safe harbor concept, qualifying
State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes oftransit through
the territory of the Community.
Id. art. 4(1) (quoted m Henry H. Penitt, Jr. & Margaret G. Stewart, FalseAlarm?,
51 FED. COMM. L.J. 811, 811 n.2 (1999)).
96
See European Commission [DG XV], Opinion 2/99 on theAdequacy ofthe
"InternationalSafe Harbor Prnciples" issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce on 19th April 1999 (visited May 3, 1999) <http://vwvw.europa.eu.mt/
commldgl5/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wpl9en.htm> [hereinafter Opinion2/99].
197 "The Working Party shall be composed ofarepresentative ofthe supervisory
authority or authorities designated by each Member State and of a representative
of the authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and
bodies, and of a representative of the Commission." European Privacy Directive,
supra note 194, art. 29(2).
19 "The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of the representatives of the Member States and chaired by the representative of the
Commission." Id. art. 31(1).
'9See Perritt & Stewart, supra note 195, at 811.
2 00Notably, both the Department
of Commerce and the European Commission
have comprehensive Web sites enabling interested parties to follow the
negotiations. This reinforces the conclusions in Part IEI of this Article that the
Internet facilitates the development of public international law.
201 Department of Commerce, InternationalSafe HarborPrivacy Principles,
para. 3 (visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/shprn.html>
[hereinafter Safe HarborPrinciples].
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United States organizations would be deemed to satisfy the "adequacy"
principle of the European legislation and thus eligible to receive personal
data transmitted from Europe. Under the principles, organizations could
qualify for a safe harbor in several ways: (1) they canjoin a private-sectordeveloped privacy program that adheres to the safe harbor principles; (2)
they can qualify to the extent that their activities are governed by United
States statutory, regulatory, or administrative law (including rules issued
by national securities exchanges, registered securities associations,
registered clearing agencies, or municipal securities rulemaking boards)
that effectively protects personal data privacy; or (3) they can mcorporate
the safe harbor principles into contracts entered into with parties transfer2 Adoption of the safe harbor
ring personal data from the EU0.
principles
must be accompanied by a public declaration of acceptance.0 3
Separately, Directorate General XV of the European Commission,
through its Data Protection Working Party, adopted the following criteria
forjudgmg self-regulatory regimes as components of an international legal
order to protect privacyFor aself-regulatory instument to be considered as a valid ingredient
of "adequate protection" it must be binding on all the members to whom
personal data are transferred and provide with adequate safeguards if data
are passed on to non-members.
The instrument must be transparent and include the basic content of
core data protection principles.
The instrument must have mechanisms which effectively ensure a
good level of general compliance. A system of dissuasive and punitive
sanctions is one way of acievmg this. Mandatory external audits are
another.
The instrument must provide support and help to individual data
subjects who are faced with a problem involving the processing of their
personal data. An easily accessible, impartial and independent body to
hear complamts from data subjects and adjudicate on breaches of the code
must therefore be in place.
The instrument must guarantee appropriate redress in cases of noncompliance. A data subject must be able to obtain a remedy for his/her
problem and compensation as appropriate.2°
2

1

See id. at paras. 3-4.

213 See

id. at para. 6.
European Commission [DG XV], JudgingIndustiy Self-Regulation: When
Does it Make a Meaningful Contributionto the Level ofDataProtectionin a Third
2
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In early 2000, European authorities and the Department of Commerce
agreed on draftprinciples, 0 5 despite earlier concerns bythe DataProtection
Working Party 2 6 that "reiterated its view that the patchwork of narrowly
focused sectorial laws and self-regulatory rules presently existent in the
United States cannot be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all
cases for personal data transferred from the European Umon. ' 07 It
expressed its support for the safe harbor approach and encouraged further
discussions to provide an acceptable benchmark. 28 The Working Party
comments identified a number of substantive protections m the April 19
safe harbor draft as to which it requested change or clarification. It also
expressed concern about enforcement mechanisms, noting "that National
supervisory authorities [in Europe] do not have jurisdiction in third
countries and consequently lack any enforcement powers which would
allow them to oversee effectively the implementation of the Principles by
U.S. orgamsations." ' °
Enforcement was considered in a joint draft paper on EU procedures,
issued by the European Commission and the Department of Commerce on
April 19, 1999 210 It described procedures for handling complaints about
noncompliance with safe harbor rules and challenges to Commission
decisions under article 25.6 of the European Privacy Directive."
The draft paper on EU procedures envisions three possible enforcement
channels. The first, and preferred, channel begins with private and
governmental complaint and dispute resolutionprocedures rathe transferee
country (the United States). If these procedures do not resolve the dispute,
member states may entertain complaints. They must seek remedial
measures from the data recipient and transferee country authorities,

Country' (visited Jan. 14, 1998) http://europa.eu.mt/comm/dgl5/en/media/
dataprot/wpdocs/wp7en.htm>
205 See InternationalTradeAdministrationElectronic Commerce Task Force
(visited May 11,2000) <http://www.ita.doe.gov/td/ecom> (providing documents
relating to Mar. 17, 2000 agreement); Opinion2/99, supra note 196.
206 European Privacy Directive, supra note 194, art. 29.
207 Opinion 2/99, supra note 196, at para. 4.
208 See id.
209
Id. at cmt. 6.
210 European Commission & Department of Commerce, US/CECDataPrivacy
DialogueDraftPaperon EUProcedures(visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.ita.
doc.gov/ecom/procedur.html> [hereinafter EUProcedures].
2 Article 25.6
of the Diective authorizes findings that adequate protection is
m place, preempting action by EU member states to block data transfers under
article 25.3. See European Privacy Directive, supranote 194, art. 25(3)(6).
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notifying the European Commission if such efforts are unsuccessful, and
not blocking data transfers unless exceptional conditions set forth in the
Directive exist. If the EC is notified, it must notify the data subject, the data
recipient, and transferee country authorities, provide an adequate hearing
in conjunction with the Article 31 Committee,212 and ultimately it may
13
revoke the finding of adequacy pertinent to the transfer.
The second channel involves complaints filed directly with member
state courts21 4 which may result in a judgment which might be executed
in the transferee country but could not block data transfers unless pursuant to provisional measures authorized in the Directive. 215 Lastly, the
final channel is a review of the validity of a decision by the European
Commission undertaken by the European Court of Justice under article
174.216

The draft paper on EU procedures is silent as to the criteria, procedures
for, or effect of recognition of a member state judicial judgment by a
United States court or agency Presumably, recognition would be sought
2 2Article

31(2) provides:
The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a
draft of the measures to be taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion
on the draft within a time limit which the chairman may lay down according
to the urgency of the matter.
The opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down m Article 148
(2) of the Treaty. The votes of the representatives of the Member States
within the committee shall be weighted in the manner set out in that Article.
The chairman shall not vote.
The Commission shall adopt measures which shall apply immediately.
However, if these measures are not in accordance with the opinion of the
committee, they shall be communicated by the Commission to the Council
forthwith. In that event:
-the Commission shall defer application ofthe measures which it has
decided for a period of three months from the date of commumcation,
-the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may take a different
decision within the time limit referred to m the first indent.
Id. art. 31(2).
213See EUProcedures,supranote 210.
214 Under article 22 of the Directive, member states must provide

"for the right
of every person to ajudicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him by
the national law applicable to the processing m Question." European Privacy
Directive, supranote 194, art. 22. Article 23 requires member states to provide for
compensation
for any damage suffered by violations. See 1d. art. 23.
2 ' See EUProcedures,supra
note 210.
216

See id.
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under the doctrine of comity217 or under the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act, 218 m those states adopting it. An obvious
problem under either recognition mechanism is that the decision of an EU
member state court might not be regarded as a civil money judgment
entitled to recognition and enforcement,2 9 but rather a penal measure.
The ultimate sanction, however, is a determination by the European
Commission that the protections on the United States side no longer are
adequate, thereby allowing a member state or the Commission itself to
block further data transfer. Tins possibility presumably would provide
sufficient incentives for the data recipient, under encouragement from the
United States government, to reach agreement with the Commission on
remedial measures, possibly including compensation. In this regard, the
Working Party's review of the April 19th safe harbor principles observes
that
[i]n an entirely voluntary scheme such as tis [envisioned by the safe
harbor principles] compliance with the rules must be at least guaranteed
by an independent investigation mechamsm for complaints and sanctions
wluch must be, on the one hand dissuasive and, on the other hand give
individuals compensation, where appropriate. 0
In a Joint Report on Data Protection Dialogue to the EU/U.S.
Summit,22i the parties reported that "the Member States support in pnnciple the proposed form of the arrangement, which wil involve a decision on the basis of article 25.6 of the EU Directive" on Data Protec-

217
21

See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).

8UNIFoRM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION

ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263

(1962).
219

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS ch. 2 intro. note (1980) (stating
that judgments are not entitled to recognition).
2 Opinion 2/99, supra note 196.
21 JointReport on DataProtectionDialogue to the EU/US Summit, 21 June
1999 (visitedApr. 17,2000) <http://www.ita.doe.gov/ecom/jomtreport2617.htm>
[hereinafter JointReport].
mArt. 25.6 provides:
The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred
to in Article 31 (2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of
its domestic law or of the international commitments it has entered into,
particularly upon conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5,
for the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of
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tion," creating a "presumption of adequate privacy protection for U.S.based organisations that self-certify their adherence to the principles and
frequently asked questions and are subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission or otherbody with similar statutory powers." 224
It recited that the parties planned to finalize the safe harbor arrangement
during the autumn of 1999.1
After considerable difficulty, the negotiations over a safe harbor for
data privacy proved successful. One can learn certain lessons from the
negotiations. First, hybrid public/private regulation can be politically
acceptable in Europe and the United States. Second, any such hybrid
scheme must reserve a role for public authorities in defining the basic
parameters ofregulatory requirement andinprovidingbackup enforcement
measures. Otherwise, self-regulatory initiatives are likely to be dismissed
as shams in the political arena. Third, working out hybrid international
regulatory regimes will succeed only when affected interestsO 6 perceive
that the negotiations will produce a result superior to what can be obtained
through other means, such as traditional state-based legislation and
rulemaking. The jurisdictional uncertainties raised by the Internet create
7
such perceptions and incentives with respect to the pro-regulatory
interests. Increasingly, they understand that relying on traditional legislatures, courts, and state-based administrative agencies will prove underinclusive, in that certain types of conduct they wish to regulate will escape
control because it will occur outside the jurisdiction of these traditional
legal and political institutions. Incentives also exist for market-oriented
interests because they fear the over-inclusiveness of traditional state-based
regulatory regimes, subjecting their activities to uncertain and conflicting
requirements and hundreds of different jurisdictions. They also are likely
to prefer hybrid regulatory regimes to an expansion of traditional international regimes because they perceive the traditional regimes as being
inflexible and unduly influenced by states without a stake in the robust
development of electronic commerce and political dialogue in the Internet

individuals.
European Privacy Directive, supranote 194, art. 25(6).
3JointReport,supra note 221.
4 Id. at para.
3.
25See id. at introduction.
One might say affected interests with sufficient political power to make a
difference.
'" In this context, "pro-regulatory" means those interests who are not satisfied
by reliance on pure market forces and the unilateral actions of market participants.
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and other new technologies. The existence of these mcentives m8 does not
however, ensure that hybrid regimes actually will be successful. Countervailing concerns exist. Pro-regulatory interests-at least with respect to
certain regulatory subjects? 9 -enjoy some measure of protection of their
interests in traditional state-based regimes, however underinclusive. They
will be reluctant to give these up m favor of untried hybrid approaches.
They will prefer to work out new international regimes that layer new
hybrid requirements on top of existing state-based requirements and
enforcement mechanisms.
Conversely, pro-market interests have no desire to see regulatory
requirements and enforcement measures multiply They want to reduce
rather than increase the complexity resulting from overlapping requirements and enforcement channels. They will never agree to international
hybrid regimes unless they have certain preemptive or safe harbor effects,
linking them to existing state-based requirements and enforcement
institutions. Moreover, all interests understand how to play existing games.
All know how to mobilize political influence in existing legislative and
adminstrtive bodies. They know how to litigate cases before existing
adjudicative and enforcement bodies. Any new regime is more uncertain
than existing ones. Accordingly, ifnew mternationalhybndregines sinply
reiterate existing substantive requirements and offer the same or greater
transaction costs of litigating in traditional fora, pro-market interests have
little incentive to agree.
Accordingly, international hybrid regimes will gain agreement only if
they offer new flexibility in rulemaking, permitting substantive duties to be
closely tailored to the realities ofrapidly changing technologies. They also
must offer more flexibility and lower cost for complaint and dispute
resolution, while at the same time being supported by effective state-based
coercive measures to compel compensation and compliance.
3. Domain Name Administration
A different kind of international hybrid regulatory regime is overseeing
Internet domain name administration?" 0 The Internet Corporation for
" See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., NegotiatedRulemakingBefore Federal
Agencies:EvaluationofRecommendationsby theAdministrativeConferenceofthe
UnitedStates, 74 GEo. L.J. 1625, 1636-38 (1986).
2 Consumer and banking regulation are examples; privacy regulation in the
United States and Internet domain name regulation are counter-examples.
"oSee PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F Supp. 2d389 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), affd sub nom. Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573
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Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") is a non-profit corporation
formed to assume responsibility for IP address space allocation, protocol
parameter assignment, domain name system management, and root server
system management functions formerly performed under United States
government contract by IANA and other entities."
In 1999, the Department of Commerce signed a Memorandum Of
Understanding Between the United States Department of Commerce and
Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers,12 wherein the
parties agreed to a"DNS Project," involving thejoint design, development,
and testing of new private mechaisms for DNS management. 3 Under the
memorandum, ICANN was expected to: (a) Establish policy for, and
allocate, IP number blocks; (b) Oversee "operation ofthe authoritative root
server system;" (c) Oversee policy for adding new top level domains; and
(d) Coordinate "assignment of other Internet techical parameters as
needed to mamtain uiversal connectivity on the Internet." ' 4
The statement of policy15 recited, among other things, that "[a]n
increasing percentage ofIntemet users reside outside of the U.S., and those
stakeholders want to participate in Internet coordination. ' 6ICANN enjoys
a lnd of quasi-governmental status under United States law by virtue of
its contract with the United States government?27
In meetings held in Berlin on May 25-27, 1999, the ICANN board of
directors adopted a number of resolutions that illustrate the scope of its
quasi-regulatory responsibilities. It defined certain "constituencies"
responsible for electing representatives for ICANN governing bodies,

(2d Cir. 2000) (describing the domain name system).
23' See id. at 399.
22
MemorandumofUnderstandingBetweenthe U.S. DepartmentofCommerce
and Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers, June 10, 1998
(visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domamname/icannmemorandum.htm>
23 3 See id.
4Id.

11 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741
(Dep't Commerce 1998) (statement of policy).
36Id. at 31,742.
"7 See PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F Supp. 2d 389, 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), affdsub nom. Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202
F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that domain name registrar Network Solutions
enjoyed federal instrumentality immunity from antitrust essential facilities liability,
thereby suggesting that immunity would also extend to ICANN).
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including country-code top-level domains ("ccTLD") registnes, commercial and business entities, global top-level domain ("gTLD") registnes,
intellectual prop erty, ISPs and connectivity providers, and registrars?3 8 The
ICANN board concluded that interests represented by a non-commercial
domain name holders constituency should be involved m the organization
process as early as possible, and urged the organizers of that constituency
to submit a consensus application for provisional recognition. 9 It also
agreed to consider proposals for a system to permit individuals to select
geographically diverse, at-large directors. All ofthese actions pertain to the
political (interest-representation) structure for policy setting and rulemaking.
At the same meetings, ICANN concluded that gTLD .com, .org, and
.net registrars should inplement a uniform dispute resolution policy for
coordinating domain name registration with trademark nghts,24 thus taking
the first steps toward a private adjudicatory system. The proposed ICANN
dispute resolution policy resulted from recommendations of WIPO. a1 In
1998, WIPO had undertaken extensive international consultations at the
request ofthe United States government aimed at developing recommendations to ICANN on questions arising out of the interface between domain
names and intellectual property rights.242 Among other things, WIPO
recommendedthat domam name registrars collect enough information from
domain name applicants and holders to permit them to be contacted in the
event of disputes, and the adoption of a uniform administrative procedure
for resolving cybersquatting24 3 disputes. It also recommended that owners

" SeeICANN, Berlin Meetings (visitedApr. 17,2000) <http://www.icann.org/
berlin/berlin-resolutions.html>
23' See id.
240 See id. For an example of such disputes, see Washington Speakers Bureau,
Inc. v. LeadingAuth., Inc., 49 F Supp. 2d496 (E.D. Va. 1999) (ordering a domam
name holder to cease using domain names infringing the trademark, but denying
the trademark
owner's claim to a property interest in the domain names).
241SeeFinalReport
ofthe WlIPOInternetDomamnNameProcess,Apr 30, 1999
(visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://ecommerce.wipo.mt/domams/process/eng/final_
report.html> [hereinafter WIPO Final Report]. A hard copy of the report is
available as official WIPI Publication No. 92-805-0779-6. See id.
242
id. at Executive Summary
243"Cybersquatting" is the term
popularly used to describe "deliberate, bad faith
abusive registration of a domain name." Id. 170. For an analysis of cybersquatting issues, see Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.
1999) (reversing aprelimmary injunction prohibiting the use ofa domain name that
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of well-known trademarks be allowed to block issuance of domain names
containing those marks or close equivalents. 2 " In addition to providing
guidelines for a dispute resolution procedure, the WIPO recommendation
defined abusive domain name registration,24 5 thus offering a substantive
246
rule for application m the ICANN system.
The proposal for a dispute resolution process was motivated in part by
the multijurisdictional character of disputes over domain names that
allegedly infringe trademarks.247 The recommendation suggested online
dispute resolution procedures for certain classes of cases,248 and endorsed
direct enforcement of decisions by registrars.249 The recommendation,
however, would not deny participants in the "administrative" process
access to regular courts,2 ° nor would the administrative process allow
monetary damages or rulings concerning the validity of trademarks.
Remedies would be limited to determinations ofthe status of the contested
domain name registration, through appropriate changes to the domain name
database.25'
Notably, supporting the proposition that the Internet facilitates
rulemaking by international bodies, ICANN, WIPO, and the Department
allegedly diluted a famous trademark).
244 See WIPO FinalReport, supra note 241, IN 245-291 (recommendations
regarding international protection for famous and well-known marks in
cyberspace).
245
See id. 7 171.
246 See
id. 1 170-177 The Report also notes that "[i]nsofar as international law
is concerned,
both the Pans Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, and the TRIPS Agreement, establish obligations for the protection
of trademarks." Id. 7 174.
247 See id. I 132(i).
A domain name's "global presence may give rise to alleged
infringements in several jurisdictions, with the consequence that several different
national courts may assert jurisdiction, or that several independent actions must be
brought because separate intellectual property titles m different jurisdictions are
concerned." Id.
241 See id.77 210-214. "Since the dispute concerns domain names, assumptions
can be made about the parties to the dispute having the requisite technical facilities
to participate
m the on-line resolution of the dispute." Id.7 211 (iv).
249 See id.
215-220.
250 See id 140.
"' See id. 150(vi). "In order to ensure the speedy resolution of disputes, the
remedies available in the procedure should be restricted to the status of the domain
name registration itself and should not, thus, include monetary damages or rulings
concerning the validity of trademarks." Id.
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of Commerce all used the Web to publish proposals and to receive and
publish comments on those proposals.
Private regulatory regimes (self-ordering mechanisms) must confront representation and consent problems not faced by state-based
legal systems. Whenever a private regulatory regime is constituted,
its scope must be defined. In other words, the universe of individuals
and entities bound by its legislative acts (rules), adjudicatory decisions,
and enforcement actions must be defined. The relationship between the
private regime and state-based institutions must be determined as well.
ICANN illustrates the difficulty of solving these problems when the
subject matter of the private ordering involves diverse interests and
wide geographic scope. ICANN's ongoing effort to define "constituencies" involves determining the scope of the regulated population.
Affected interests want to be represented in ICANN's decision making
bodies if they are to be bound by its rules and decisions. The difficulties
are especially great with respect to representation of non-commercial domain name holders and the general class of Internet users, who
are supposed to be represented through "at large" directors of
ICANN.
ICANN also struggles with the relationship between its rulemaking and
dispute resolution bodies and state-based legal institutions. The final WIPO
report devotes several paragraphs to this subject, concluding that ICANN,
domain name registrar, and WIPO rules on cybersquatting do not displace
national (state-based) rules, abjuring authority to decide the validity of
trademarks, a question left to national courts, in preserving disputant access
to state-based courts even when they consent to submit their disputes to
private dispute resolution bodies.253
The "constitution" of private regulatory regimes comprises a web of
contracts throughwhichparticipants grant powerto private rulemaking and
adjudicatory bodies and consent to be bound by their decisions. The
ICANN apparatus again is a good illustration.2 54
But the efficacy of these contractual arrangements is only as great as
state-based legislation and adjudication allow Contractually agreed-to

22 See ICANN Website (visited Apr.

18,2000) <http://www.icann.org/general/
abouticann.htm> (describing the system of representation and goals of

ICANN).
3

See WIPO FinalReport, supranote 241.
' See ICANN Website, supra note 252.

1
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adjudicatory decisions mustbevalidated.255 Individuals or entities excluded
from a private regime may claim that the private regimes "constitution"
violate state-based competition law 6
These interdependencies between public andpnvate regulatory regimes
are addressed by what this Article calls matrices for hybrid regulation. The
matrices can be explicit and developed in advance, as is the aim of the
Department of Commerce/EC negotiations over a dataprivacy safe harbor,
or they can be the result of case-by-case adjudication of disputes arising out
of the operation of a private regime, as has been the situation with United
States self-ordering regimes such as technical standard-setting bodies 25 and
private associations.25
4. Credit CardCharge-backs
The explosion of e-commerce on the Internet has stimulated governmental interest in low-cost dispute resolutionmechamsms for transnational
consumer disputes. The most common form of alternative dispute
59
resolution for consumer disputes in the United States is a credit card
charge-back. Under the Fair Credit Billing Act, 260 credit card issuers must
"investigate"2 6' cardholder clams 262 of"billing errors." "Billing errors" are
defined to include "[a] reflection on a statement of goods or services not

11 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
(Federal Arbitration Act) ch. 2, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
Awards
21 6See PG Media, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), affd sub nom. Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solution, Inc., 202 F.3d 573
(2d Cir. 2000).
,7See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656,
658 (1961) (finding that an arbitrary and capricious application of the standard by
the trade
association violated the Sherman Act).
68
1 See Perritt, CyberspaceSelf-Government,supranote 191, at 456 (discussing
private associations).
21 9 Debit card charge-backs are covered by Federal Reserve Regulation E, 12
C.F.R. § 205.11 (1998), rather than Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(i) (1981),
which governs credit card transactions. The definition of error in Regulation E
§205.11.
omits
claims of nondelivery or nonconforming goods or services. See id.
260 Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1994).
26 See id. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii).
262 The claim must be in writing. See id. § 1666; Himelfarb v American Exp.
Co., 484 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1984) (holding oral notice msufficient).
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accepted by the obligor or ls designee or not delivered to the obligor or his
designee in accordance with the agreement made at the time of a
transaction. 26 3 When cardholders allege such non-acceptance or nondelivery, the Issuer may not insist on the charge without determining "that
such goods were actually delivered, mailed, or otherwise sent to the obligor
and provid[ing] the obligor with a statement of such determination." 2
Under Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z,265 charge-backs extend only to
consumer and not to business transactions.2 64
Card issuers typically retain only limited authority--defined by the
merchant and cardholder agreements-to adjudicate the dispute, although
repeated claims involving the same merchant may jeopardize the
merchants' membership in the credit card network.267 In most cases, the
cardholder protests the charge, a charge-back results, the merchant

15 U.S.C. § 1666(b)(3). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(3) (Federal Reserve name registration itself and should not, thus, include monetary
damages or rulings concerning the validity of trademarks." Id. Regulation Z).
The term also includes transactions as to which the cardholder requests documentation as to the validity of the charge. See id. § 226.13(a)(6).
264 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii). Regulation Z defines the required mvestigation to include such a determination:
If a consumer submits a billing error notice alleging either the nondelivery
of property or services under paragraph (a)(3) of this section or that
information appearing on a periodic statement is incorrect because a person honoring the consumer's credit card has made an incorrect report to the
card issuer, the creditor shall not deny the assertion unless it conducts a
reasonable investigation and determines that the property or services were
actually delivered, mailed, or sent as agreed or that the information was
correct
12 C.F.R. § 226(13)(f) n.3 1.
265 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(c)(3)(B) (1988).
266
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 (1999).
267 See FTC Expects Processors to
Insulate Operations Against Consumer
Fraud, 11 No. 23 BANKING POL'Y REP 6 (1992) (describing the settlement between FTC and Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., requiring the credit card processor
to monitor charge-back rates and to stop processing charges from merchants with
unusually high rates, as a protection against consumer fraud); Patrick E. Michela,
"You May Have Already Won
" Telemarketing Fraudand the Needfor a
FederalLegslativeSolution, 21 PEPP. L.REv 553,571 & n.116 (1994) (reporting
that consumer fraud operations often are demed access to credit card systems
because of high charge-back rates).
263
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substantiates the charge, informal negotiation directly between merchant
and cardholder may ensue, and the charge is reinstated.
Major credit card networks extend charge-backprotection internation2
ally, 68 and have adopted special consumer protection charge-back rules for
electromc commerce.269
Although good empirical data is lacking, it appears that the system
satisfies both consumers and merchants. Almost no reported cases in the
regular courts exist, suggesting that consumers rarely are motivated to go
beyondthe charge-backprocess to more formal forms of dispute resolution.
It is important to understand the apparent attractiveness of the chargeback mechamsm. Several hypotheses can be offered as to why it works so
well. Charge-backs give customers leverage with merchants against whom
See Letter from Broox W Peterson, Senior Vice President and Assistant
General Counsel, Visa International Service Association, to Secretary, Federal
Trade Commission (Mar. 25, 1999), availableat <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/
comments/visa.htm>
Visa's chargeback rules do not attempt to track all of the possible consumer
protection laws around the world, although some chargeback rights do
correspond with statutory rights granted to consumers m particular
countries, such as the rights granted under Federal Reserve Board
Regulation Z to dispute certain credit card transactions. The chargeback
reasons permitted under Visa's rules for international transactions have
been adopted to enable issuers of Visa Cards to address the fundamental
consumer concerns of their cardholders, and incidentally to reinforce the
reputation of Visa Cards as the best way to pay.
Id.
"While U.S. law requires us to institute these practices, as a card issuer, we
have adopted a policy of applying them consistently outside the U.S. as well. If a
cardmember outside the U.S. is afforded more protection under local law, we of
course comply with that law." Letter from Sally Cowen, Group Counsel, American
Exp. Travel Related Services, Incorporated, to Secretary, Federal Trade
Commission (June 30, 1999), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/
comments/amencanexpress. htm>
269 We will immediately chargeback a merchant selling
goods or services
delivered electronically(e.g., software, unages) if a cardmember disputes
the charge (for example, claiming it was unauthorized). There are several
sound business and policy reasons underlying this rule: processing an
mquiry is costly and not justified by the usually small dollar amount of
these transactions. In addition, an immediate chargeback for these types of
purchases provides an incentive for the merchant to exercise greater care in
authorizing such transactions.
Id. (emphasis in original).
268
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they have claims, thus equalizing to some extent otherwise disparate
bargaining power. Psychological satisfaction results from triggering a
charge-back, even if the customer eventually has to pay the full price. In at
least some cases, triggering a charge-back gets the merchant's attention,
allowing the merchant and consumer to work out a compromise. And, m
extreme cases, there is the possibility that the consumer will not have to
pay or that the merchant will be excluded from the credit card network,
ending a pattern of consumer abuse. Moreover, the system is cheap, easily
accessible, and quick. A consumer need not search for and find a lawyer or
a third party dispute resolution forum. All that is necessary upon receipt of
a monthly credit card statement is to call or write the card issuer and protest
the charge. The card issuer and the merchant handle the rest. No dispute
resolution fees are involved.
Merchants like the system compared to other possibilities such as
accepting personal checks for a larger percentage of transactions because
the merchant is in a better position with credit card charge-backs than with
stop payment orders on checks. Ifa consumer buys merchandise or services
with a personal check and then stops payment on the check to protest
failure of the merchant to perform, the merchant has no attractive remedy
It must either sue the consumer or cut the consumer off from further checkpayment privileges. Cutting the consumer off may be an effective remedy
for the merchant when there is a continuing relationship between merchant
and consumer, but not in the one-off stranger transactions increasingly
important to electromc commerce. Lawsuits over small consumer
transactions are no more attractive to merchants than to consumers. They
are expensive, require lawyer involvement, and engender long delays.
Credit card charge-backs are a more common form of dispute
resolution in the United States than in other prosperous nations.2 0 One of
270Charge-backs

are required by law m the United Kingdom and not provided
for m France, although Visa and Mastercard systems provide them throughout
Europe to some extent See Consumer Redress in the Global Marketplace:
Chargebacks, 11, OECD Doe. OCDE/GD(96)142 (June 10, 1996) [hereinafter
Consumer Redress], available at Documents de 1996 (visited May 22, 2000)
<http://www.oecd.org//dsti/sti/itleonsumer/prod/e_96-142.htm> In the United
Kingdom, merchants have interpreted section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act of
1974, 22 & 23 Eliz., 2, § 75 (Eng.), which establishes a charge-back regime, as
inapplicable to international transactions. U.K. credit card issuers have agreed to
apply section 75's protections in certain limited categories of international
transactions. See ConsumerRedress, supra, at 70. The OECD's Committee on
Consumer Policy has addressed the possibility of establishing an international
charge-back regime that would overcome the domestic limitation of national legal
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the reasons is the existence of Regulation E m the United States, which
requires card issuers to make charge-backs available.271 Canadian banks
strongly oppose the institution of charge-backs because of concern about
processing costs for card issuers.2" Tis reluctance is reinforced by the
perception of Canadian card issuers that the incidence of disputes is much
higher m electronic commerce than in conventional face-to-face
27
commerce. 3
In Europe, charge-backs are not required, but they are nevertheless
fairly common in credit card and debit card agreements.274 Their availability in debit card agreements is much more important m Europe than in
credit card agreements, because the proportion of consumer transactions
accomplished through debit cards relative to credit cards m Europe is much
igher than in the United States, although the total of credit and debit card
transactions is a much smaller proportion of the total universe in Europe
than inthe United States.275 The relatively wide availability ofcharge-backs
m Europe despite the absence of any government compulsion to offer them,
is strong testimony to their attractiveness as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism.
Credit card charge-backs put a private sector intermediary m the
position of being the dispute resolver. Intermediaries are willing to do this
because the availability of mutually acceptable dispute resolution facilitates
consumer and merchant use of the intermediary's service. Intermediaryprovided dispute resolution greatly reduces search and other costs because
the intermediary already has a relationsinp with both disputants.2 76
The features of charge-backs encourage public international law to
provide an appropriate framework. As the preliminary OECD Report stated
Financial intermediaries appear best suited to resolve individual
transaction problems m the global marketplace through chargeback
mechamsms. Tis involves reversing a transaction (charging it back to the
seller) to settle various types of problems (e.g. non-delivery of goods,

regimes. See id. at 7
271 See ConsumerRedress, supra note 270, at 70.
27See d. at 58.
273 See id.
274 See id. at 62-63, 65-68.
275 See id.
276 See generally John Rothchild,

Protectingthe DigitalConsumer The Limits
ofCyberspaceUtopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893,977 (1999) (proposing that credit card
systems expand charge-back rights to facilitate electromc commerce).
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non-conformance of goods, billing errors, etc.). Chargeback mechanisms
encourage merchants to provide lgh levels of customer satisfaction, as
card associations withdraw card privileges from merchants with excessive
chargeback rates. Such mechanisms have long been available m the
United States and are credited with helping to create consumer confidence
m and widespread use of catalogue shopping in that country. During the
several years of discussions on this project with card associates, the spread
of such mechanisms internationally and to debit cards has been seen as an
277
encouraging sign.
5. Regulatory Categories
In assessing the prospects for success of different approaches to hybrid
regulation, it is important to distinguish technical standard setting from
other forms ofregulation. When an organization like the Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF") sets standards, such as by prescribing the Internet
Protocol ("IP") or the Transport Control Protocol ("TCP"), compromises
are necessary in the negotiation of the standard, but enforcement through
coercion is unnecessary Compromise is necessary because some participants in the standard setting process benefit from the selection of a
particular standard, while others lose. For example, a vendor whose
existing technology is consistent with an adopted standard can expect
increased demand for its product, while a vendor whose existing technologyis mconsistent with the adopted standard faces sharply reduced demand
or else must incur costs to change its products to conform with the new
standard. As with any negotiation, affected interests will participate m the
negotiation and agree to a negotiated outcome only ifthey perceive that the
benefits of standardization outweigh the benefits of alternatives to a
negotiated agreement. The literature on the dynamics of standard setting
concludes that some configurations of market share, beliefs about the
direction of technology development, and transaction costs will produce
voluntary agreement on standards, and other configurations will not.2 8
When standards are adopted voluntarily, separate enforcement
measures are unnecessary Users and sellers of affected technologies and
products can decide for themselves whether to comply with the standard,
and generally do so because of positive network externalities from
ConsumerRedress, supra note 270.
generallyMark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
NetworkEconomic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV 479 (1998) (providing an economic
analysis of standardization).
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standards compliance. Moreover, a decision by a particular vendor or user
not to follow the standard imposes no particular costs on any other vendor,
user, or society.
In other forms ofregulation, the incentives for widespread compliance
are fewer, andthe harms from noncompliance greater. For example, a seller
may obtain large benefits from engaging in fraudulent transactions. That
seller has strong economic incentives not to comply with rules against
consumer fraud. Allowing noncompliance victimizes defrauded consumers.
Accordingly, a legal regime aimed at reducing consumer fraud must have
not only effective and efficient rulemaking mechanisms, it also must have
effective enforcement mechanisms.
But enforcement involves depriving the targets of enforcement of
property and/or business opportunity, occasionally backed by deprivations of liberty, as when incarceration results from criminal prosecution.
Norms of political legitimacy and rule of law require some measure of due
process before any legal system deprives persons of property or liberty
27 9
interests.
Other regulatory regimes fall somewhere between technical standard
setting and rule adoption and enforcement. These intermediate regimes
involve the allocation of rights to scarce resources, as when frequency
spectrum is allocated, when imminent domain is usedto force one property
owner to allow another property owner to make joint use of property,280 or
when Internet domain names and the power to register them are allocated
among competing contenders. As to these intermediate regimes, the
concern is not so much with mobilizing coercive power to enforce rules
(although coercion occasionally must be necessary to oust one property
owner in favor of another) as it is with due process, to make sure that
resources actually are allocated in accordance with previously articulated
rules.
So what do these differences mean for the design of matrices for
international hybrid regulatory systems? First, the same political forces that
induce legislatures to make new laws will operate regardless of the type of
regulation to shape the rulemaking process and-at least to some
extent-the content of the rules regardless of whether they are made by
public assemblies, government agencies, or private enterprises or coalitions. Requirements derived from antitrust law and imposed on private
standard setting organizations decades ago under RadiantBurners,Inc. v.
279 See U.S.

CONST. amends. V, XIV; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368.
28 See Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1996).
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Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. 281 and Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.v.
Indian Head,Inc.2 82 are examples of this public scrutiny at work.
It is with respect to decision making in individual cases and enforcement that the differences among the three types of regulatory regime
matter. With respect to technical standard setting regimes, neither case-bycase adjudicatory procedures nor enforcement matters much. With respect
to regimes that allocate scarce resources, the availability of fair adjudicative procedures matters, but not enforcement. With respect to regulatory
regimes aimed at curbing harmful conduct, such as consumer protection or
privacy regulation, the availability of effective coercive enforcement, as
well as adjudicative due process and fair rulemaking, matters.
In societies honoring the rule of law, where the state has a monopoly
on the use of coercive power because such power is necessary for effective
enforcement regimes, the linkages between state-based institutions and
private regulatory mechanisms must be strongest with respect to conductaltering regulatory regines. Conversely, when only technical standard
setting is involved, linkages to state-based enforcement are least necessary
andthe greatest degree of privatization can be satisfactory Both resourceallocating and conduct-altering regulatory regimes need adjudicative due
process, and therefore public law matrices for those two types of regulation
must include prescriptions for adjudication. But, as the long and successful
history ofprivate arbitration shows, adjudication need not be conducted by
public bodies; it may be conducted by private entities subject to relatively
permissive review when the power of the state is sought to back up
decisions by the private adjudicative bodies.
6. The Limits ofLegal Compulsion
Understanding that conduct-alterngregulatoryregimes mustbe backed
by coercive enforcement mechamsms does not mean that no attention is
necessary to incentives. On the one hand, strong incentives for noncompliance can swamp almost any level of coercive enforcement resources. The
prevalent drug trade and the failure of Prohibition are examples. Conversely, areas of commerce and political and social interaction exist in
which the power of social norms or economic forces provides such strong

"' Radiant Burners, Inc. v Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961).
2 Allied Tube
& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,500 (1988)
(holding that the exclusion of a product from the trade association code is subject
to antitrust scrutiny for objective reasonableness).
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incentives for rule compliance that resort to coercive enforcement rarely is
necessary Credit card charge-backmechamsms and-perhaps--eBay's2 83
array of unilaterally adopted private complaint and dispute resolution
procedures are examples.284 Because merchants and their associated
intermediaries conclude that customers will be satisfied only if they have
access to effective complaint and dispute resolution procedures, they make
such procedureg available, and respect them without the need for much
coercive backup by public bodies. Even when this is the case, however, an
occasional lawsuit may be necessary to collect a debt or to defend against
a clain of breach of contract for anti-competitive behavior.
7 Prospects
The EU/U.S. Data Privacy negotiations and domain name regulation
involve two very different subjects for regulation. Domain name regulation
is close to techncal standard setting, while data privacy regulation involves
imposing duties on one set of interests in order to benefit another set of
interests. Few interests would prefer no domain name regulation at all, at
least if they favor continued use and expansion of the Internet.285 The
controversy with respect to domain name regulation relates, not to whether
there should be regulation at all or how much regulation, but to
entitlements to perform economically in connection with operation of the
domain name system. The controversy also relates to conflicting interests
between trademark owners and users or applicants for Internet domain
names that may resemble trademarks, m a period of transition between
locally based trademark protection and the inherently global effect of
Internet domain names.
286
Private regulation, on the other hand, is not as universally attractive.
Some important interests would be just as happy without any legally2 eBay (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.eBay.com>
" See eBay UserAgreement (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.eBay.com/
help/community/png-user.html> (section 17 of the UserAgreement states the rules
relating to arbitration).
"s Conceivably, some private network service providers would bejust as happy
to see the Internet go away so they could serve the demand for electronic
commerce and political interaction through private networks with proprietary
protocols.
" In addition to the questions of incentives raised m the text, important
democratic values are at stake. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace SelfGovernance:A Skeptical View From Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF L.
REv 395 (2000).
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imposed privacy protection. Thus controversies over international privacy
protection regimes relate not only to the allocation of responsibility for
managing the regime, but also to questions of the degree of protection and
the robustness of enforcement regimes.
Other regulatory subjects present similarly different conflicts of
interest. Certain forms of banking regulation, for example, involve
standards for settlements." 7 Participants care little about the details of this
system, as long as they know what those details are. Other aspects of
banking regulation, however, involve interests in greater conflict, such as
those relating to capital requirements andtransparencywhich disadvantage
borrowers including depository institutions (such as banks) and advantage
lenders.288 But state and private interests also exist who want to reform
89
capital market regulation to improve stability 2
If the EU/U.S. Data Privacy negotiations are successful, and if the
controversy over ICANN regulation of Internet domain names wanes, the
world community will have two new, and strikingly different, models for
international hybrid regulation. An attractive subject for adapting these
models exists with respect to consumer protection in Internet-based
electronic commerce. The basic norms of consumer protection differ little
from state to state, although the details vary considerably 290 Additionally,
effective and aggressive consumer protection agencies already exist at
various levels of government around the world.2 9' Substantive harmony
means that pro-regulatory interests could lose relatively little in a new
international hybrid regime that embraces universally recognized norms of
consumer protection. The existing traditional regulatory matrix creates
incentives for pro market interests to move toward an international hybrid
regime that would provide more flexibility in rulemaking, while reducing
the problems of regulatory overlap and over-mclusiveness. The proregulatory interests have an incentive to work out a new international
hybrid regime because of the marked undernclusiveness of traditional
state-based regimes.
Public choice theory suggests, however, that negotiation of an
international hybrid regime for consumer protection may be more difficult
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 206.1.
8
"s
See, e.g., id. § 3.6; id. § 204.1.
28 9SeeAmencanBankersAssociation
(visited May 11,2000) <http://www.aba.
coIn>
29 See Frances E. Zellers et al., ConsumerProtectionin the European
Union,
20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. LAw 97 (1999).
291 See, e.g., IllinoisAttorney General(visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.ag.
state.il.us/>
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than in the privacy arena because of the bureaucratic interests of the
multiplicity of existing consumer protection agencies. 292 They want to
preserve a role for themselves, and may have difficulty understanding just
how an acceptable role can be retained in a new hybrid regime. This land
of bureaucratic interest already has proven difficult m the EU/U.S. Data
Privacy negotiations, which have faced problems due to the different
approaches taken by the European Commission, the Article 31 Committee
and United States officials. 293 The problem would be more acute m the
consumer protection arena because consumer protection agencies exist
around the world, including at multiple levels m the United States, while
data protection commissioners exist only m Europe.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Internet is a vast new marketplace and arena for political discourse. Its inherently global character and low barriers to entry facilitate
participation by many individuals, small enterprises, and political action
groups effectively demed participation in traditional markets and political
channels. The Internet's characteristics are changingthepolitical dynamics
of international law formation and enforcement, and these changes are
likely to increase the influence of the international legal system.
The Internet also invites new forms of regulation, as state-based
lawmakers and administrators struggle to extend their jurisdiction over
conduct occurring through the Internet that has effects within their
territories. This struggle to avoid threats to local values is giving rise to
new models of regulation through the international legal system-especiallyto models that provide apublic law framework forpnvate,
self-regulation.

generallyPeter H. Aranson et al., A Theory ofLegislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. REV 1 (1982).
293 See InfoWorld.com (visited June 12, 2000) <http://www.mfoworld.com/
articles/ic/xml/00/01/14/000114icpnvacy.xml>
292 See

